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The concept of Sociedades Laborales (SLs) is unique due to its hybrid 
nature and the benefits this entails. Although their survival rate has been studied, 
there is still a vacuum regarding their growth in terms of employment. While the 
concept of SLs exists in all of Spain, the Basque Country and its Gipuzkoa 
Province are of particular interest due to their prosperous economy and 
availability of information. In this thesis, I used multiple different approaches. 
First, I applied the dynamic classification method to analyze the evolution of 
Spanish SLs and conventional companies. Second, I used the same method at 
the Basque Country level. Third, I carried out a cohort analysis of Basque SLs 
and Basque conventional companies. Finally, I described six case studies from 
the Basque Country which, while not representative of the whole population of 
SLs, illustrate firsthand how the SL model is performing in these companies. 
Findings indicate that SL Basque cohorts grow faster until year two, but then are 
surpassed by conventional firms; that there is no clear evidence that the SL model 
benefits companies of a certain size over the rest; that despite recent regulatory 
relaxations, the model still hinders growth due to restrictions on employment of 
non-owner workers. Despite these findings, I support that growth is obstructed by 
how the SL model is implemented rather than by a fundamental problem of 
employee participation as a concept. 
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My interest in this topic stems from my work experience. Since I entered 
the labor force, most of my positions have been at small businesses from different 
industries. The question on how to make these small businesses grow prompted 
me to study business administration in the search for tools that would stimulate 
expansion. 
While I knew the concept of employee participation, I first formally studied 
it when I came to Germany. It offered a wide array of implementation options, 
each with a different degree and type of participation. The most interesting aspect 
to me was that its benefits seemed to create the right environment to facilitate 
growth. 
One of the employee participation models I was presented with was that 
of Sociedades Laborales, which only exists in Spain. This unique hybrid concept 
combines the benefits of conventional companies and cooperatives. Therefore, 
given its potential to be exported to other jurisdictions, it is my aim to find out if 




SLs are not a separate legal form such as LLCs and joint-stock companies, 
but a qualified form of these legal forms. In other words, a company that meets 
all the criteria to be registered as an LLC or a joint-stock company can qualify as 
an SL if they meet some additional requirements, which can be summarized as 
follows: 
• At least 50% of its shares must be owned by working employees. 
• No single shareholder may control over 33% of the company (exception: 
there can be only two owners during the first 36 months since the creation 
of the company; public organizations can own up to 49%). 
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• Non-owner employees can work up to 49% of the annual hours worked by 
owner employees. 
• 10% of the annual net profits must go into a special reserve fund. 
Given these key features, they can be considered as “an intermediate type 
of firm between conventional capitalist firms and worker cooperatives” (Croce et 
al., 2014). In other words, they strike a balance between cooperatives and their 
well-known restrictions (namely, the inability to raise capital from non-working 
investors when they are growing, making them a victim of their own success) and 
traditional capitalist firms with a clear-cut separation between owners and 
workers. 
Due to this balance, one can argue that SLs are a tool that can boost 
growth and help newly created micro companies become small and medium 
businesses at a faster rate. SLs can profit from employee participation benefits 
(mitigation of agency issues, improved productivity and employee engagement, 
better employee retention, more economic resilience) while not completely 
renouncing the chance to profit from external capital and external professional 
management. 
SLs have been used in the past as a tool to combat unemployment during 
an economic crisis (even though this was not their main purpose), proving to be 
a way to go from nothing to the creation of a micro company. On the other hand, 
they have been criticized as too rigid for companies to grow into larger 
companies: “…regulatory restrictions derive in negative consequences that 
outweigh the positive effects…” (Croce et al., 2014). Because of this, I have 
studied how SLs grow in comparison with conventional companies to analyze if 
the SL model has helped them grow through the different size brackets. 
This topic is of importance considering most businesses start as micro 
companies. For instance, in 2015, out of the 90,460 firms that were created, 
87,860 (97%) had 10 employees or fewer (Bel Durán & Lejarriaga Pérez de las 
Vacas, 2018), which means if SLs as a legal instrument could be adapted so that 
a large number of these new businesses can profit from the concept to grow 
faster, it would significantly boost the economy. This thesis helps extend the 
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knowledge on SLs and also provides useful information for policy makers who 




Despite its benefits, I observe that the concept of SLs has been losing 
momentum for the past few years. Some have attributed this to an overly 
restrictive regulatory framework (Croce et al., 2014), which could be refuted by 
the 2015 reform and the relaxation of requirements it introduced. Others have 
mentioned that the concept is either not known or not enticing enough, 
mentioning there could be more tax benefits to qualified companies (Bel Durán & 
Lejarriaga Pérez de las Vacas, 2018). 
The main hypothesis of this thesis is that despite their waning popularity, 
SLs are an effective tool that boost growth. The current decline in newly created 
SLs could be reverted with a better promotion of the concept and a further 
simplification of the bureaucracy involved. 
The second hypothesis is based on the possibility that that companies of 
certain size categories profit better from the SL model as a catalyst for their 
growth; for instance, micro and small businesses might use the model up until 
they grow into the medium bracket, which would indicate that SLs work as an 
incubator. 
Finally, given that not all autonomous communities are the same, I will 
delve into SLs in the Basque Country, a special jurisdiction within Spain with tax 
autonomy, which allows local government to make adjustments to the SL model 
in order to improve its performance. Thus, the third hypothesis is that the Basque 
Country is better prepared and thus SLs fare better than in the rest of the country. 
For the analysis, I have obtained data from SLs and conventional 
companies in Spain and in the Basque Country, besides carrying out some case 




4 Relevance of the Thesis 
 
This thesis offers further insight into the SL model and how it has 
performed in the past few years in Spain and the Basque Country. It also presents 
some suggestions based on technical inconveniences encountered during the 
process. Its analysis can also be taken into account in case the SL model is to be 
adopted by other countries. 
 
4.1 Deepening of Knowledge on the SL Model 
 
This thesis provides further information about growth of SLs both in Spain 
and in the Basque Country. Both jurisdictions offer interesting information: Spain 
because it is where the concept first originated, and the Basque Country because 
they were able to modify legislation in order to meet their goals; besides, this 
autonomous community is considered to be a role model in terms of economic 
performance both in general terms and in the social economy. 
By analyzing the growth rates of SLs and conventional companies, this 
thesis also puts the SL model to a test in order to prove whether its benefits are 
substantial enough as the theory suggests. The existing literature has also 
focused on how SLs have typically higher survival rates; however, by 
differentiating between survival and growth, the standard for the model is set 
higher. For instance, the motivation boost that employee ownership entails does 
not necessarily translate into a motivation to grow a company larger, as the 
working-owners could be satisfied with the current company size. 
 
4.2 Technical Issues 
 
Another contribution provided by this thesis is a description of all the 
technical inconveniences in the process of gathering and analyzing data. Not only 
have I encountered issues due to non-standardized data bases, but also in some 
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cases due to a complete lack of data on a phenomenon that I believe should be 
watched closely. 
In the first place, not all statistics organizations in Spain use the same 
methodology to classify their data, despite the fact that they manage remarkably 
similar information. Some methodological inconsistencies were found within the 
same institution, which made the gathering and analysis of data particularly 
difficult. For instance, it was found that the classification based on activity can 
used different codes when analyzing SLs versus conventional companies. 
Besides, information for some activities was missing (or perhaps, only partially 
available), which rendered a comprehensive analysis per sector unfeasible within 
the scope of this thesis. A similar discrepancy was found for the classification of 
companies in size brackets: Not all aggregate data is presented using the same 
size brackets. Some provide size brackets that others do not (for instance, some 
include the category 100+ employees while others divide it into 100-249 and 
250+). These issues could be solved by adhering to the standard classification 
methods in the EU or by allowing the public to narrow down the search with a 
more customizable interface. 
Another issue was the lack of longitudinal data readily available to the 
public, which rendered a diachronic analysis of SLs more difficult. Upon 
consultation, it seems this information is simply not gathered by government 
organizations, unlike what happens in other regions such as the US, where 
complex analyses can be carried out thanks to a vast quantity and quality of data. 
Finally, another problem encountered was the lack of information on 
disqualified companies, i.e. former SLs who were either dissolved or converted 
into conventional companies which are completely disregarded by the 
organizations in charge of statistical services. Given the interest in carrying the 
SL program forward, it seems natural to want to keep track of those companies 
that were no longer fit for it so that corrections can be made. However, there is 
no registry of disqualified SLs and thus their analysis is only restricted to some 
case studies or to a survey that was carried out after the fact and that is not 
comprehensive of all existing disqualified companies. 
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Upon bringing up these issues, I hope the availability of data improves in 
the future and, if this is not the case, I hope that this thesis helps other 




This thesis also seeks to contribute information for those who intend to 
import the SL model into other jurisdictions. As previously mentioned, there are 
several benefits to employee ownership, and a deeper look into the results of its 
implementation in Spain and the Basque Country could help design the right 
policies in other territories. Given the evolution of this legal concept in Spain (from 
non-existence to regulation, and then, the 2015 relaxation) and given the 
peculiarities of the Basque Country situation (tax autonomy and the ensuing tax 
regulation tweaking that took place as the economic scenario changed), this 
thesis seeks to show whether these policies are backed by the data, namely, 
growth data. 
Employee ownership can be a tool to reactivate the unemployed, and as 
such, be adopted in a struggling economy. In this sense, I could be imported into 
Argentina, a country that has struggled to grow for years and whose legal 
framework only includes employee ownership in the form of cooperatives but 
ignores the possibility of a mixed concept as the one from Spain. For instance, 
the case of the Bauen Hotel in downtown Buenos Aires “is both base and 
inspiration for Argentina’s worker cooperative movement” (Gilbert, 2014), and an 
example of how employee ownership struggles in the country. It was founded in 
1978 and sold to a foreign investment group in 1997. The business did not do 
well thereafter and struggled until it filed for bankruptcy in 2001, amidst a national 
economic crisis. The building was sold but its employees continued operations 
nonetheless in the hopes of maintaining their source of income, since most were 
at an age where re-insertion into the workforce would be too difficult (Lucotti, 
2019). The owner of the building took legal actions to evict the employees, a 
process which until 2019 was still underway (Infobae, 2019). Had it been possible 
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that an external investor joined the workers and provide the capital to purchase 
the building, then a solution could have been found. 
On the other hand, employee ownership is not only a tool to combat 
unemployment, but also a way to foster entrepreneurship, regardless of what the 
unemployment rate is. Proof of this is the fact that according to a study of SLs in 
Andalusia, over 65% of the SLs that were surveyed did not receive funds from 
the capitalization of unemployment benefits (FEANSAL, 2012), which is one of 
the main features the SL model provides to foster the creation of companies by 
unemployed persons. In my thesis, I provide a global analysis of how all 
companies grew, regardless of whether they were set up by employed or 
unemployed workers. 
Another reason to import the concept is securing the continuity of family 
businesses. According to a study carried out by Ernst and Young Argentina in 
2019 (La Nación, 2019), 90% of SMEs in the country are family businesses, and 
they generate over 50% of the GDP. One of the most common issues they 
experience is succession: 4% survive the third generation and only 1% survives 
the fourth. In facilitating employee ownership and transferring the business to 
those who are committed the most, these percentages could increase 
significantly.  
Finally, the SL model can be used to promote a more equitable distribution 
of the company’s gains while giving the employees more participation in and, 
therefore, more identification with, the company in which they invest their work 
hours. In theory, this helps promote enterprises with a longer-term perspective of 
growth and a stronger sense of commitment. One of the key features of the 
Argentinean economy is its lack of long-term planning. On top of this, Argentina’s 
Gini coefficient was 41.4 in 2018 according to The World bank Group (2018), 
which is not ideal. Improving the situation of employee participation could help 
both issues. 
Regardless of the reason why a policy maker might want to import and 
adapt the SL model, this thesis provides valuable information on how the concept 
fared in Spain, what worked and what did not. Therefore, I hope it proves useful 
in adapting it into the receiving legal framework. 
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Since SLs are not a separate legal form but just a qualification a regular 
company can receive makes the concept easier to export. Argentina’s law on 
commercial companies from 1984 (Ley General de Sociedades No 19.550, 1984), 
for instance, includes the equivalent to Spain’s sociedad anónima and sociedad 
limitada, under the names of sociedad anónima (joint-stock company) and 
sociedad de responsabilidad limitada (limited liability company). In 2017, a new 
type of company was created by combining the benefits of the two existing types 
into sociedad por acciones simplificada (simplified joint-stock company) (Ley de 
Apoyo Al Capital Emprendedor No 27349, 2017). All three types would be able to 
undergo a qualification process should the SL model be adapted into the 




This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 deals with the concept of 
SLs in Spain, their history, and their regulatory framework; it also describes the 
current decline in SL registrations and explains why the Basque Country has 
been selected as a point for comparison. Chapter 3 starts with a description of 
the theory on growth, followed by how, in my opinion, growth and the SL model 
are connected; finally, it describes the current situation of SLs in the Basque 
Country. Chapter 4 describes the analyses undertaken for this thesis (research 
design), their inherent limitations, and results obtained. Chapter 5 provides a 
discussion of the results, comparing SLs with conventional companies in Spain, 
describing growth of SLs in the Basque Country and comparing SLs in Spain with 




II. The Concept of Sociedades Laborales in Spain 
 
 
1 History of Sociedades Laborales 
 
Sociedades Laborales (SLs) are a concept from Spain whose beginnings 
can be traced back to 1964 when Sociedad Anónima Laboral de Transportes 
Urbanos de Valencia (SALTUV) was created, “becoming a milestone in the 
history of enterprise collectivization” (Lejarriaga Pérez de las Vacas et al. 306–
307). Since then, the concept and its legal framework have evolved through five 
different stages (Lowitzsch et al., 2017), with law 44/2015 being the latest piece 
of legislation to regulate SLs in Spain. 
The first Sociedad Laboral, SALTUV, was the practical solution to a critical 
situation which would have otherwise resulted in the company going bankrupt. 
The processed this involved was, at that moment, not regulated by any specific 
law. With the passing of time, it became clear that employee ownership could be 
a way to systematically solve larger crises and could kick-start many projects that 
would have otherwise remained undone. The first SL law passed in 1997 starts 
declaring “The aim of obtaining new methods to generate employment […] is a 
constant concern of society that is not unknown to legislators” (Ley 4/1997, de 
Sociedades Laborales, 1997), clearly emphasizing the potential of this model to 
create jobs as one of the fundamental elements behind the passing of the law. 
 
1.1 The 1997 Law 
 
The legal framework kept evolving since the creation of SALTUV in 1964 
until the 1997 law on SLs was passed. According to this first legislation (replaced 
in 2015 by a new law on SLs and participatory companies), requirements 
consisted of the following: 
• Incorporation by at least three partners: The law indicated that at least 
three founding partners were required. This could have the benefit that as 
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a new business, owners would profit from the knowledge of others instead 
of starting a business alone, reducing the probability of failure, especially 
in the case of unexperienced entrepreneurs that might be investing their 
unemployment benefits and that have much at stake. 
• No individual partner could hold more than 33%: This restriction ensures 
that no partner had control over general corporate decisions in the firm, 
making the organization more democratic by limiting the power of each 
owner in the organization. 
• According to this first law, non-owner employees could work up to 15% of 
the hours worked by their owner colleagues. This limit was extended to 
25% for companies with fewer than 25 worker owners. With this provision, 
the law ensured that most of the employees that work are also owners, 
leaving out the possibility that ownership might be concentrated in a small 
group within an organization where the vast majority are non-owner 
employees. This was one of the key points to be relaxed by the 2015 law. 
• Preference order for the acquisition of shares: This preference is designed 
so that shares remain within the group of employees. Only in case there is 
no buyer among the employees (owners and non-owners) can the sale be 
advertised to third parties. 
• Regulation of share transference in case an owner-worker ceases to work 
for the firm: This way, the law controls that those shares owned by 
employees who leave the firm stay within the firm unless no existing 
employee can acquire those shares. 
• Special Reserve Fund consisting of 10% of yearly net profit: This fund is 
set up in order to ensure the firm’s ability to support the purchase of shares 
by workers who are not owners yet. 
• Correction deadlines in case of violation of requirements: The law foresees 
the possibility of a firm going beyond these limits and thus sets a deadline 
to bring values back to normal, meaning SLs do not automatically lose their 




The SL model can thus provide all the benefits traditionally associated with 
employee ownership, which have been summarized in Lowitzsch et al. (2017) as 
follows: 
• Improved company management and communication: mitigation of 
agency problems: Given that owners and employees are in the same 
group, their interests are aligned and access to information is more 
symmetrical compared to traditional companies in which employees have 
limited access to strategic decisions and the information on which those 
decisions are based. This allows employee-owners to better assess the 
work of managers hired. Moreover, shirking is reduced due to peer control 
from fellow workers (Hyde, 1991; Robinson and Wilson, 2006). 
• Improved operational efficiency: higher labor productivity and 
competitiveness: Related to the previous point, this alignment of interests 
causes employees to be better motivated to cooperate toward a common 
goal and strive for the company’s overall success, rather than just looking 
after one’s personal achievements. Consequently, it can be argued that 
SLs have a head-start on other companies as they have a better chance 
at becoming efficient as they tend to be more productive and profitable 
(Freeman, 2007). 
• Improved HR management: better at recruiting and retaining talent: Due 
to SMEs small size and fewer resources, it is harder for them to attract and 
retain employees when compared to what larger enterprises can offer. SLs 
can compensate for this by offering their employees the opportunity to 
become owners, allowing them to actively participate in the company’s 
decision-making process and entitling them to a part of the profits (Morris 
et al., 2006; Sengupta et al., 2007). 
• Improved economic resilience: As explained in Lampel et al. (2010), some 
studies (Nuttall, 2012; Kramer, 2010) have demonstrated that employee-
owned companies tend to have a steadier sales growth rate and a longer-
term approach to operations, proving to be more stable. In other words, 
employee-owned firms are more averse to risk, and the SL model helps 




1.2 The 2015 Reform 
 
The 1997 law was then replaced by a new law on SLs in 2015. Among 
the modified features, the following can be mentioned as summarized in 
Lowitzsch et al. (2017): 
• Incorporation no longer needs at least three partners from the start: A 
company can be set up with only two partners, each holding 50% of the 
shares, during an initial 36-month transition period, during which a third 
owner must be found. 
• The working hours threshold was modified in 2015 to allow non-owner 
employees to work up to 49% of the hours worked by employee-owners, 
as opposed to the 25% established by the 1997 law. 
• Financial assistance for the purchase of shares is now allowed via a 
special reserve fund, facilitating the acquisition of shares by new 
employees when the price is not within their reach. 
• Modification of share acquisition priority: The 2015 law gave preference to 
those owner-workers who owned fewer shares over the rest. 
• Extended deadline for share transference upon employment termination: 
Former employees have now one month to offer their shares after their 
employment status was terminated. 
• The special reserve fund is now capped at 200% of social capital and can 
be used to help non-owner-workers acquire shares. 
• Disqualification deadline: overall relaxation of deadlines to rectify 
violations that lead to SL disqualification. 
This law also introduced the concept of a participatory company 
(“sociedad participada”, not to be confuse with Basque sociedad civil participada, 
SCP), which is a non-qualified form that could be considered as a half-way point 
between SLs and traditional firms. They do not meet the criteria to qualify as SLs, 
but they still encourage employee participation in social capital, in profits and/or 
in decision making at some level. This reform sought to foster the creation and 




If implemented correctly, participatory companies could help maintain a 
certain degree of participation in those cases where the SL model, even after the 
relaxation of its requirements, is still too restrictive and hinders the proper 
performance of a business. 
 
2 Decline of SLs over Time 
 
Throughout the years, the popularity of the SL concept has fluctuated 
greatly. Upon analyzing Figure 1 below, one can notice that few SLs were 
registered in Spain in the years prior to the 1997 law. After this legislation was 
passed, the number of new companies under this legal qualification skyrocketed 
to 6,013 in 2002. From that year onward, the number of new SLs waned 
continuously. It is worth mentioning that this decline was not stopped by the 2008 
crisis, contrary to the rise of SLs one might expect given that “employee-owned 
firms, especially worker cooperatives, are more likely to be established when 
there is an economic downturn” (Logue & Yates, 1999). 
 
Figure 1 SL Registrations in Spain vs. Year (1991-2018) 
 
Note. Own elaboration with data from MITRAMISS (2019) 
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A similar decline can be observed in the Basque Country, one of the most 
prosperous jurisdictions in Spain. The number of new SL registrations has been 
lower every year since 2013 (refer to Figure 2 below). 
 
Figure 2 SL Registrations in the Basque Country vs. Year (2009-2018) 
 
Note. Own elaboration with data from EUSTAT 
In line with this drop in popularity, some have pointed out that ownership 
is not that important a factor. Some literature indicates that good results could be 
achieved regardless of the ownership structure and focusing on employee 
participation, namely, shop-floor participation (Galilea Salvatierra et al., 2002). 
Although this paper deals with cooperatives as opposed to capitalist firms, many 
points are still valid for the analysis of SLs, such as the fact that “employees 
generally have limited wealth and hence may have trouble in financing labor-
managed firms by themselves” (Galilea Salvatierra et al., 2002). 
Other studies, such as Croce et al. (2014) have provided additional 
evidence to show that “regulatory restrictions derive in negative consequences 
that outweigh the positive effects [of SLs] expected by most authors”. In this 
article, the authors are pointing to how the 1997 law had already grown old and 
needed to be updated. It is unknown to me whether this study directly triggered 
the 2015 reform, but its ideas were aligned, since legislators designed the new 




According to Bel Durán & Lejarriaga Pérez de las Vices (2018), 5.5% of 
all active micro-LLCs in 2016 did not qualify according to the 1997 law but did 
qualify under the new regulations, thus bringing the percentage of qualifiable 
micro-LLCs up from 23.61% to 29.18%. Although this did not mean that those 
companies would automatically apply to become SLs, it did indicate that the SL 
status became accessible to more firms. 
Upon analyzing Figure 1 and Figure 2 again, one can conclude that the 
2015 reform was not able to overturn the decline in new SL registrations despite 
its newly introduced flexibility. After discussing this phenomenon with ASLE, a 
Basque non-profit organization whose aim is to support SLs, they suggested this 
paradoxical lack of popularity despite the more lenient requirements could be 
explained by how the statistics are generated. The SLs that are accounted for are 
those in the social security regime, and those SLs registered with two founding 
partners (as allowed by the 2015 law in its effort to the qualification requirements), 
are not mandated to apply for a registration number in the social security regime. 
This would also suggest, however, that these companies are not growing or at 
least, they are not finding a third partner within the 36-month period stated in the 
law, or else they would appear in the registry. 
Another aspect to consider when analyzing SLs and how the concept 
affects companies and the overall economy is the classification of companies 
according to their activity and size. The Statistical Classification of Economic 
Activities in the European Community establishes 21 first-level industry codes, 
each with multiple subcategories into which each company falls according to their 
main activity (European Parliament, 2006). This standardized classification called 
NACE allows the comparison of a company’s performance with that of its sector, 
which is fairer than comparing it with the whole population of companies, most of 
which might be affected by other sector-specific situations. 
Companies are also classified according to their size by the European 
Commission as follows: Micro, small and medium enterprises (‘SMEs’) are those 
that employ fewer than 250 persons and have an annual turnover of up to EUR 
50 million and/or an annual balance sheet of up to EUR 43 million. Small 
enterprises are defined as having fewer than 50 employees, an annual turnover 
and/or annual balance sheet not exceeding EUR 10 million. Micro-enterprises are 
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defined as enterprises that employ fewer than 10 persons and whose annual 
turnover and/or annual balance sheet total do not exceed EUR 2 million 
(European Commission, 2014). Consequently, any firm exceeding these 
limitations can be considered a large firm. This is summarized in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1 Enterprise Categories by Size 
Category Employees Annual turnover 
Micro company < 10 persons < EUR 2 million 
Small company < 50 persons < EUR 10 million 
Medium company < 250 persons < EUR 50 million 
Large company > 249 persons > EUR 50 million 
Note. Own elaboration with data from European Commission (2014) 
 
Both the NACE and the size classifications could be factored into the SL 
analysis in order to determine whether the model is more effective for certain 
companies. In this paper, I have focused on the size analysis to study aggregate 
data and I have used the sector classification for the case studies. 
Despite the decline in new SL registrations, and in light of the 2015 reform 
as an attempt to keep the concept of SL as an important part of the Spanish 
economy, I consider the benefits of SLs are worthy of further studying. There are 
signs that this decline is due to implementation reasons (e.g. lack of promotion), 
and while there is still room for improvement, the model can be improved by 
tweaking the legislation so that more firms can profit from the benefits of 
employee participation in all its forms. 
 
3 Focus: The Basque Country 
 
The Basque Country is one of Spain’s 17 autonomous communities. 
Located in the North, in 2019 it was the place of residence of over 2 million 
citizens according to the latest data from the Basque Institute of Statistics 
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(Instituto Vasco de Estadística, 2019). The Basque Country has a strong cultural 
identity, which has been reflected by its history and its separatist movements. 
Cultural differences are so deeply rooted that they even affect language; the 
Basque Country has two co-official languages: Spanish, like the rest of Spain, 
and Basque, a language whose origin remains unclear as it has no connections 
with any other living languages (Calderon, 2019). 
This autonomous community consists of three provinces: Alava, Biscay 
and Gipuzkoa. This means government has 5 levels: EU, Central Government 
(Spain), Basque Government (autonomous community), Provincial Councils 
(each of the 3 provinces) and Municipalities (at city level). 
As opposed to other areas in Spain, the Basque Country opted for 
industrialization instead of tourism, and this was boosted by the fact that the area 
is rich in natural resources. This industry quickly internationalized, turning it into 
a success story (Cooper, 2012). According to Spain’s National Statistics Institute 
(INE), in 2018 the GDP per capita of the Basque Country was €34,079, which is 
31.8% higher than the national GDP per capita in the same year (€25,854). Being 
highly industrialized and one of the richest areas of Spain, the Basque Country 
also has high wages and high labor productivity when compared with the rest of 
the country, and the unemployment rate is lower (Zubiri, 2014). 
The Basque Country’s success is also reflected in the social economy, as 
they are home to the Mondragon Corporation, the world’s largest cooperative 
group which was established in 1954. It included over 280 companies and 
employed over 80,000 people in 2018 (Mondragon Assembly, 2018). The case 
of this cooperative group has been widely studied by scholars around the globe. 
The Basque Country actively supports employee participation in 
companies. The province of Gipuzkoa, for instance, has proposed a model based 
on three approaches (Aizpuru Murua & Agote Alberro, 2016): First they focus on 
people and knowledge and seek to create a space where economic 
competitiveness is reached through people’s training and education. The second 
approach focuses on three types of sustainability: economic, social and 
environmental, thus ensuring that competitiveness, innovation, social cohesion, 
employment and the environment prevail. A third approach consists of economic 
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reactivation, promoting sustainable entrepreneurship. In this sense, they consider 
participatory companies a key tool as they boost competitiveness and help with 
wealth distribution. 
Another prominent feature of the Basque Country as explained in Zubiri 
(2014) is its unique tax regime under the Basque Economic Agreement, which 
grants them an exceptional degree of autonomy that allows the Basque 
Government and the Provincial Councils the ability to pass their own tax 
legislation to better achieve their goals. The only other autonomous community 
in a similar situation is Navarre, under the Navarre Covenant Regime; all 15 
remaining communities are subject to the “common system of financing”. 
In the common system, autonomous communities are assigned funds by 
the Central Government according to need. Since 2009, this need is calculated 
by factoring in all basic services provided by autonomous communities: 
education, health, and social services. Each community must devote 75% of their 
tax collection to these services, and the remaining amount is provided by the 
Central Government. This amount is called “sufficiency transfer” and can be 
positive or negative (if the community collected more taxes than they need to 
spend in basic services). Communities under this regime have no control over 
certain aspects such as corporate income tax, which is fully within the Central 
Government’s jurisdiction, or personal income tax, which is 50% under the control 
of the Central Government. Moreover, most of the remaining taxes are collected 
by the Central Government. 
On the other hand, the Basque Economic Agreement is a system in which 
all taxes are collected by the community itself and then, according to their relative 
wealth, a sum is paid to the Central Government. Thus, the equation is not based 
on need but on capacity. This grants the Basque Country a significant degree of 
autonomy to design their taxation system, but it also shares the burden as the 
community has to bear all costs of tax collection (possibly encouraging efficiency 
within the Basque Government). Under this regime the community has, for 




Thanks to the Basque Economic Agreement, tax reforms carried out by 
the Gipuzkoa Council in 2016 and 2020 were possible. In 2016, the government 
sought to foster employee participation in companies as a way to encourage 
investments while preventing delocalization, a threat in today’s globalized world 
(Diputación Foral de Gipuzkoa, 2016). Four years later in 2020, the government 
introduced more tax reforms to mitigate the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic and 
try to reactivate the economy (Diputación Foral de Gipuzkoa, 2020). 
Another feature of the Basque Country that is key to this thesis is the 
availability of information. Given that Spain has a decentralized system, there 
exist several publicly funded data sources both at national and community levels 
whose access is relatively easy, although at times, the data bases are set up 
using different parameters which hinders a proper comparison. In the Basque 
Country, however, not only is there access to the local statistics institute, 
EUSTAT, but also to ASLE, a non-profit organization that supports SLs and works 
closely with them. This has facilitated both access to more information about local 
companies and its interpretation. 
Given its exceptional economic results and its ability to modify legislation 
more freely and thus faster adapt to changes, the Basque Country is a model 
worthy of analysis. Its advancement is made evident, for instance, in the fact that 
the Gipuzkoa province has already started implementing the ESOP concept from 
the US in the form of SCPs (“participated civil society”). Features from the SL 
model in the Basque Country should be taken into consideration for the rest of 
Spain and other countries who intend to import the model. 
Moreover, access to information in the Basque Country allowed me to 
carry out case studies. This has given me a glimpse of what happens when a 
company cannot grow due to the SL qualification restrictions, a point of major 
criticism within the model. This is particularly interesting given the introduction at 
national level of the concept of participatory companies in 2015, and although 





III. Theoretical Framework 
 
 
1 Growth Theory 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, the term growth makes reference to the 
positive or negative relative change of a firm’s size in terms of payroll (number of 
employees). It is, however, an extraordinarily complex phenomenon: It is affected 
by the interplay of a multitude of factors of varying importance, and its 
measurement can be done using different indicators, sometimes offering 
opposing results. Growth can be studied on a case-by-case basis, or with 
aggregate data from a population of companies, but the results usually cannot be 
directly generalized to other companies due to the aforementioned complexity of 
the phenomenon. This is a consequence that stems from the nature of firms 
themselves, as explained in Penrose & Pitelis (2009) “Because of its complexity 
and diversity, a firm can be approached with many different types of analysis—
sociological, organizational, engineering, or economic—and from whatever point 
of view within each type of analysis seems appropriate to the problem in hand.” 
In the following sub-sections, I present a summary of the theory of growth 
and how it can be studied according to the existing literature, taking into account 
stages, measurement methods and the most important factors. 
 
1.1 Growth Stages 
 
The literature offers a multitude of models that define stages firms go 
through while growing. These models often assume a linear path that can be 
criticized for being too theoretical. According to the analysis carried out in Levie 
& Lichtenstein (2008), from 1962 until 2006, 104 different models were published. 
They all have a definite number of stages, each of them characterized by a 




Levie & Lichtenstein (2008) identified that most of these models originate 
from just a few “source nodes”, i.e. models that were later modified to spawn new 
versions of it. These source nodes are: 
• Greiner’s “Evolution and Revolution”: Consists of five predictable 
stages firms go through that include interlocked periods of 
calmness and unrest, leading up to an unknown sixth stage. 
• Christensen & Scott’s “Stages of Corporate Development” defines 
stages that go from a simple organization to a more complex firm. 
• Normann’s “Morphogenesis” makes emphasis on environmental 
conditions and proposes four different stages. 
• Lippitt & Schmid’s “Organizational Life Cycle” is centered on the 
idea that companies go through life cycles as if they were living 
organisms, although these cycles are not predictable as in other 
living beings. 
• “The product life cycle”, which also compares firms to organisms 
and, as such, are mortal. 
Since there seems to be no consensus and some of the models are even 
industry-specific, this thesis has not taken them into account in the analysis. 
 
1.2 Growth Measurement 
 
Many indicators could be used to measure a firm’s growth; among them 
are market capitalization, asset value, market share, profits, sales, and 
employment. However, not all of them might lead to the same results while 
studying a company. For instance, a firm may increase its profits not because it 
grew larger but because it reduced its costs thanks to the introduction of a more 
efficient process. Similarly, a company’s market share could grow because a 
competitor went bankrupt, without any actual growth having taken place. 
The second issue with these indicators is their availability. Some are not 
publicly available and gathering them can be an extremely time-consuming task, 
and even if one were to individually contact each firm, they could refuse to provide 
the data if they deem it sensitive information. Sales numbers, for instance, are 
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publicly available only when a company is publicly traded so that actual and 
potential investors can learn about the company in which they are investing, but 
this is not the case for privately held companies whose shares are not offered to 
the general public. The availability issue is even greater when studying smaller 
companies whose reports might not be accurate or which might not have the 
resources (namely, time) to gather and submit the data. 
For these reasons, employment can be considered the most efficient way 
of studying growth. Most jurisdictions have publicly available statistics based on 
employment data that governments regularly update. This method, however, is 
not perfect. Employment statistics usually do not include workers registered as 
autonomous or independent workers; for instance, the study on Spanish SLs in 
Lowitzsch et al. (2017) states that “official employment figures do not capture 
independent workers which are estimated to account for between 15% and 25% 
of overall employment”. 
Another benefit of using employment as main indicator is that it is one of 
the two variables used by the European Commission to classify companies in 
size categories (refer to Table 1). This classification is used by most statistical 
services providers, which facilitates comparing information across data bases 
from different institutions. Although ideally growth is best studied with longitudinal 
data at company level, given that such precise data is so difficult to obtain, 
available aggregate data on employment from these institutions is also useful for 
analyzing the growth of a population of companies. 
 
1.3 Growth Factors 
 
According to Storey (2016), small business growth can be analyzed from 
three approaches: the entrepreneur, the strategy, and the firm. Later, a fourth 
approach considering external factors was added. 
Factors pertaining to the entrepreneur refer to the owner’s personality 
traits, and how these may have an impact on the development of the business. 
According to this theory, entrepreneurial factors are motivation, education, 
ownership and management experience, number of founders, ethnicity and race, 
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age (of entrepreneur), and gender. As summarized by (Fadahunsi, 2012), 
gender, and ethnicity and race by themselves have not been found to be of 
importance when analyzing growth. On the other hand, the other factors should 
receive more attention. Higher education, prior ownership and management 
experience, and higher number of owners have been linked to faster growing 
businesses. As for age, middle-aged entrepreneurs have been considered as 
having both the experience and the resources to grow a business faster (Storey, 
2016). Motivation to grow has been found to be a defining factor, as the attitude 
of those involved translates into the firm’s performance. 
Factors that relate to the firm are defined in Storey’s framework as those 
about the business configuration, and they are usually decided upon foundation. 
These have an impact on how the firm is managed as they set the grounds for 
the organization’s dynamics. Namely, these factors are sector, location, size, and 
ownership form. The age of firm is also included under this category. Their 
importance when analyzing growth is more controversial. Location (typically, rural 
versus urban) and sector have proven that individual case studies need to be 
carried out, as no clear-cut conclusion is usually possible. Younger firms have 
been thought of as more prone to fast growth, although it was also found that 
they “are not significantly more likely to grow than more established ones” 
(Fadahunsi, 2012). Smaller firms are usually reported to grow faster than larger 
ones; however, a 2008 study by the US Small Business Administration (USSBA, 
2008) found that most jobs were created by small firms with 20 or more 
employees. As for ownership form, i.e. the legal structure of the business, Storey 
(2016) found that limited liability companies tend to grow faster than other legal 
entities, but Fadahunsi (2012) posed the question whether incorporation is the 
cause of growth or just its consequence. In other words, companies might be 
registered under a certain legal form when they have grown large enough. 
Strategy factors are those decided upon once the business is already in 
operation and pertain to the sensible use of available resources. This is one of 
the key aspects that set small businesses apart from larger companies, as the 
former usually struggle with more limited resources while for the latter, for 
instance, skilled labor and capital are more readily available. Into this category 
fall workforce training, management training, marketing strategy, 
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internationalization, technical resources, planning, external advice and support, 
and financial resources. According to the findings of Savery & Luks (2004), firms 
that intend to grow are more likely to increase training for their workers; however, 
it is worth mentioning that training is more frequent in larger companies, so it 
might be a cause or a consequence of growth. Something similar occurs with 
planning, since long-term planning can be associated with growing companies, 
but it can also be a necessity that arises when a firm becomes too large 
(Fadahunsi, 2012). As for management training, Storey (2004) found that “there 
is currently no satisfactory assessment of the link between small firm, formal 
management training and firm performance”; such a controversial finding 
suggests that a link with growth and performance might exist but is not linear. 
Regarding marketing strategy, Fadahunsi (2012) indicates that faster-growing 
small firms tend to focus their strategy on innovation rather than price. 
Internationalization has also been found to have an impact on boosting growth, 
even though smaller firms have fewer resources to reach foreign markets. The 
adoption of sophisticated technology is also said to help growth, although 
Fadahunsi (2012) raises the question as to what is considered technology, since 
each sector and company can use the term for different elements. Finally, 
financial resources are usually a requirement for growth, and since external 
funding is usually hard to obtain for smaller firms, “small businesses in which 
owners are willing to share equity tend to be reported to be more likely to grow” 
(Fadahunsi, 2012). 
Environment factors also play a role in how a company performs and, 
therefore, how it grows. Long has been written about tools to analyze it, such as 
the SWOT framework, designed in the 1960s, which includes the “opportunities” 
and “threats” categories for the positive and negative aspects surrounding a 
business. There is also the PEST framework, which provides four main 
categories (political, economic, socio-cultural, and technological) for dissecting 
the environment. Later on, multiple variants of the PEST model were developed 
to include more categories, such as legal and ecological factors. Smaller firms 
are particularly affected by their surroundings because they have “comparatively 
limited opportunities to influence their environment” (Fadahunsi, 2012). 
Consequently, faster growing firms tend to be located in more favorable 
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environments where, for instance, policies are directed toward boosting growth 
and the economy as a whole is expanding. 
 
2 Sociedades Laborales and Growth 
 
The SL model has unique features that, in theory, could help firms that 
qualify as such perform better and, therefore, be more prone to faster growth. 
The reason for this model to be particularly advantageous is the fact that it is an 
intermediate solution between cooperatives and traditional capitalist firms (Croce 
et al., 2014). This means they profit from the best of both concepts: all those 
traditionally associated from employee ownership together with the possibility of 
raising private capital and hiring professional management that will be closely 
monitored. They are thus placed at the center of a continuum whose ends suffer 
from the disadvantages of their design. Namely, cooperatives have trouble 
raising private capital because they only allow each member to have equal voting 
rights despite the amount of capital contributed to the organization, discouraging 
external capital owners from investing in the company, which would require that 
they contribute capital in exchange for little power that does not compensate for 
the investment and the risk it entails. Traditional capitalist firms, on the other end 
of the continuum, draw a clear line between owners and employees, thus 
separating interests and increasing conflict within the organization that could 
hamper its growth. 
32 
 
Figure 3 Continuum between Traditional Capitalist Firms and Cooperatives 
 
Note. Own elaboration 
 
Because of this special configuration, SLs have been studied from 
different angles to verify how they perform compared to other types of companies. 
The most relevant approach within the framework of this thesis on growth relates 
to SLs’ survival rates, since growth and survival are related, even though they are 




2.1 Survival Rate of Sociedades Laborales 
 
One of the key aspects that has been analyzed about the SL model is their 
survival rate and how it compares to conventional companies. In this sense, 
Lowitzsch et al. (2017) analyzed data from INE and MEYSS to look into SLLs 
(qualified LLCs) and conventional LLCs founded between 2005 and 2011. 
According to their findings, 88% of SLLs in Spain survived one year after their 
foundation; 63% survived after three years and 49% after five years. The results 
are summarized in Figure 4 below and are compared against those of 
conventional firms. 
 
Figure 4 Survival Rates of SLLs and Conventional Companies Founded in 2005-2011 in Spain 
 
Note. From Lowitzsch et al. (2017) 
 
As noted by the authors, it is worth mentioning that data from INE includes 
both conventional companies and SLs, and even though SLs represent a small 
proportion of the total, results are slightly biased toward indicating that 
conventional companies survive longer. 
Lowitzsch et al. (2017) also studied survival rates in the Basque Country. 
They were able to adjust their results to include those SLLs (limited liability SLs) 
that had disqualified as such and continued operations as conventional 
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companies. These would have otherwise been shown as non-survivors, as they 
disappear from the SL database. 
 After analyzing the 2003 SLL cohort over a 10-year period, the authors 
found that without including disqualified enterprises, survival rates could be 
biased by up to 7 percentage points. Even as early as year three, the first 
differences can be noticed as the number of disqualified companies starts 
growing. The adjusted and unadjusted results are presented in Figure 5 below. 
 
Figure 5 Survival of 2003 SLL Cohort in the Basque Country over 10 Years 
 
Note. From Lowitzsch et al. (2017) 
 
2.2 Survival versus Growth 
 
Survival is close to growth in the sense that without the former, the latter 
is not possible. The results from Lowitzsch et al. (2017) already indicate that SLLs 
tend to be active longer than conventional companies, especially if disqualified 
companies are taken into account. Moreover, the fact that their findings arise from 
analyses that span over the World Financial Crisis of 2008 and the following years 
of economic hardship is also a good sign for the SL model. 
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One could argue that growth and survival are thus positively related. 
However, the survival of a firm does not necessarily translate into growth, as a 
company can maintain its size, shrink, or alternate between growth and shrinking 
without making any substantial progress when compared to the starting point. As 
per the findings in Smallbone et al. (1995), “growth is often a discontinuous 
process in SMEs”. 
The key differentiating factor is motivation. While most legitimate 
businesses seek indefinite survival (the most notable exception being businesses 
that are set up for a specific purpose and are dissolved once this is fulfilled), only 
a part of them truly seek growth. As mentioned earlier in section 1.3, while it is 
not the only determining factor, motivation to grow among those who manage a 
firm is a key element for growth since it directly translates into the business 
strategy, which then might or might not be successful, but at least determines the 
direction in which decisions are taken, and how the organization will respond to 
external forces. 
 
2.3 Sociedades Laborales as a Growth Catalyst 
 
Due to their hybrid nature mentioned under section 2, SLs are theoretically 
better suited to allow growth should this be their goal since they positively 
influence many of the growth factors that have an impact on the development of 
the firm. 
In this sense and based on the growth-defining entrepreneur factors 
according to Fadahunsi (2012) described under section 1.3, the SL model boosts 
most of them. First, due to the alignment between the workers’ and the 
organization’s interests, it should be easier for an SL that is seeking growth to 
actually obtain it. As for education, SLs per se do not have an impact on the 
education of the company’s owners (they do not inherently encourage higher 
educated people to create businesses), but they do provide training through non-




Since SLs allow for the capitalization of unemployment benefits, one could 
argue that they encourage entrepreneurship among skilled workers, thus 
increasing the previous owner/managing experience of their worker/owners, 
which is another factor linked to faster growing businesses. This could also be 
related to age (of the entrepreneur), another factor that can influence growth as 
middle-aged founders tend to own faster-growing companies (Storey, 2016). 
SLs also foster the creation of companies by more partners due to the 
minimum number of founding partners restriction. Although the correlation 
between these two factors is not linear, it has been found that businesses with 
more owners tend to have a faster growth rate (Morris et al., 2006). 
Pertaining to the firm factors, since their impact on growth is not that clear, 
it is hard to estimate what impact the SL model could have to aid or restrict 
growth. Perhaps the only element that could be mentioned in this sense is legal 
form, as it was found that LLCs tend to grow faster than sole proprietorships 
(Storey, 2016), and SLs by definition cannot be a sole proprietorship. 
As for strategy factors, the SL model is designed to facilitate training for 
worker-owners, which could be considered a cause or a consequence of growth, 
as previously mentioned. In the case of SLs, one could argue that it is more a 
cause since non-profit organizations set up to accompany and support SLs work 
with companies from the start, meaning they help them grow since their earlier 
stages. The opposite would be true if these institutions were mere training 
providers that only catered for larger companies that can afford their training 
programs. 
Another strategy factor that SLs target is the availability of financial 
resources. This has been one of the most criticized aspects of cooperatives, 
which struggle to obtain external financing once they reach a point in which their 
partners can no longer keep up with the need for funds. On the other hand, not 
only do SLs provide the opportunity to capitalize on unemployment benefits at the 
start to facilitate the initial capital needed to set up the business, but also, they 
allow external investment to a certain degree. Moreover, the SL model allows 
companies to transition into conventional companies without changing their legal 
status. This disqualification means a company can go over the restrictions if 
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needed and then continue to operate, as opposed to a cooperative that would 
require a deeper legal structural change. 
Finally, environmental factors are also a key to growth, and because SLs 
have separate regulations that seek to help them, it could be argued that they are 
better prepared to adapt to their environment. This is especially true for 
companies in the Basque Country, which not only are set up in an economically 
successful and internationalized area (both important factors for growth), but also 
have been backed up by a regulatory framework that has been fast enough to 
respond to external elements such as the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. Because 
of this, one could expect SLs in this autonomous community to be able to grow 
at a faster pace than both their conventional counterparts and the SLs from the 
rest of the nation. 
 
2.4 Sociedades Laborales as Incubators 
 
Although in theory SLs are supposed to thrive, their numbers have not 
been positive in the past years. The SL model has been criticized by some 
authors as being too restrictive to a point that the negative effects outweigh the 
positive ones (Croce et al., 2014). And despite the requirements relaxation the 
2015 law brought about, it is true that the number of new SL registrations has not 
picked up, which could be interpreted as a sign that the reform was not enough. 
Moreover, as indicated by Bel Durán & Lejarriaga Pérez de las Vacas (2018), in 
spite of the signs of recovery displayed between 2013 and 2016 by LLC 
registrations in Spain, SLLs did not follow the trend, meaning the overall 
economic recovery of the country did not help to create new SLs either (see   
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Table 2, Figure 6 and Figure 7 below).  
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Table 2 Number of Sociedades Laborales and Conventional LLCs Registered per Year in Spain 
Year of Registration Sociedades Laborales Conventional LLCs 
2007 2 341 140 815 
2008 1 514 102 247 
2009 1 225 77 393 
2010 1 252 79 202 
2011 1 145 84 137 
2012 1 006 86 591 
2013 892 92 859 
2014 770 93 439 
2015 515 93 982 
2016 417 100 456 
2017 331 93 911 
2018 347 94 662 
2007-2018 variation -85% -33% 
Note. Own elaboration with data from MISTRAMISS (2019) and INE (2020) 
 
Figure 6 Conventional LLCs Registered per Year in Spain 
 
Note. Own elaboration with data from INE (2020) 
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Figure 7 Sociedades Laborales Registered per Year in Spain 
 
 
This is evidence that either the concept has room for improvement or that 
it might not be as beneficial to all organizations, most of which are registered 
under the traditional, non-qualified legal forms. This popularity loss is also visible 
in the number of active companies nation-wide between 2011 and 2019. Figure 
8 below shows the relative number of active companies and the number of active 
SLs in Spain taking 2011 as the base year. As can be seen, SLs seem to be on 
the decline when compared to the whole population of companies in the country. 
 
Figure 8 Relative Number of Active Companies (All) and Active SLs in Spain. 
 
Note. Own elaboration with data from MITRAMISS (2019) 
Note. Own elaboration with data from MITRAMISS (2019) 
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Despite the popularity loss of the SL model, the concept of employee 
participation behind it offers certain benefits that growth-seeking companies can 
profit from during their initial years. Once the SL model becomes too restrictive, 
they grow out of it and disqualify to continue their operations as regular entities 
that, I assume, continue to foster employee participation to a higher degree than 
conventional firms, thus becoming participatory companies. 
These disqualified companies are unaccounted for in Figure 8 due to how 
records of active SLs are kept. In this sense, SLs could work as an incubating 
tool to start businesses and help them grow and enter the market. Statistics are 
thus designed to strictly show the performance of the SL model but not to provide 
a holistic view on how employee participation both in qualified and disqualified 
companies is faring. 
 
2.5 Disqualification of Sociedades Laborales in Andalusia 
 
Little has been written about disqualified SLs in Spain. One exception is 
the survey carried out between 2010 and 2012 by FEANSAL (2012), an SLs 
federation based in the southern autonomous community of Andalusia. Although 
their study does not cover Spain as a whole nor the Basque Country, I still believe 
their findings are worth mentioning since some of their findings could also apply 
to SLs in other regions. 
Their sample consisted of 154 disqualified SLs in Andalusia and their aim 
was to delve into what caused such disqualification. For this purpose, they 
inquired companies about several aspects related to the SL model, namely, how 
they decided to become an SL in the first place, whether they had received 
unemployment benefits as a lump sum, whether they had received fiscal 
incentives, what their perception of workers as partners was, what social security 
regime they adopted, and how they decided to give up their SL qualification. 
According to this survey, 65.58% received funds from capitalized 
unemployment benefits, 40.56% received subsidies at the start of their operations 
as an SL, and 7.14% received subsidies past their initial stages. Inclusion of 
workers as partners is viewed positively by 80.52% of respondents; 88.96% 
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believe there should be no limits to the number of workers with an indefinite 
contract, and 63.38% indicated this limitation might have been a cause for 
disqualification. 
The idea of registering an SL arose from the input of external advisors in 
66.23% of the cases. Interestingly, the idea to disqualify as an SL also originated 
from external advisors in 66.23% of the cases, and only 33.12% made the 
decision on their own. The vast majority (92.21%) stated they had no intentions 
of disqualifying at the moment they set up the business, indicating that 
disqualification most likely developed at a later point in time. 
Amongst the reasons to create an SL, the survey found 53.25% chose the 
model due to incentives they expected to receive; 35.06% chose it for ideological 
reasons; and 5.19% mentioned the capitalization of unemployment benefits as 
the main decisive factor. As for the reasons to disqualify, 40.91% indicated lack 
of incentives was the cause; 17.53% mentioned the limitations on workers hired 
on an indefinite contract; and 3.9% stated the lack of tax incentives was the main 
reason. 
Based on their survey results, FEANSAL concluded the main reasons to 
disqualify are the following: 
• Lack of awareness of the SL legal framework: The study suggests 
entrepreneurs tend to rely on external advisors to whom they feel close 
rather than on organizations such as FEANSAL, which are better 
suited to advise on how to manage an SL. This results in the external 
advisor finding SLs require learning about the model, and therefore 
they end up encouraging disqualification. 
• Limitations on the number of indefinite contracts: FEANSAL concluded 
these limitations are taken as punitive rather than as an incentive to 
hire worker-owners. 
• Lack of interest in workers becoming owners: The study concludes 
both workers and organizations do not have enough incentives to 
encourage the transformation from workers to worker-owners. 




• Issues receiving incentives at the start of operations: FEANSAL found 
there are some issues in the implementation of these incentives that 
result in many companies not receiving them. These incentives should 
work together with the capitalization of unemployment benefits to help 
entrepreneurs set up and start their business. 
• Lack of incentives for on-going SLs: Most incentives only focus on the 
initial years, leaving the organization on its own later on. 
• Lack of separate fiscal treatment similar to that of cooperatives. 
This survey was carried out before the 2015 reform, which brought about 
more flexibility and addressed the issue on the limit on indefinite contracts. It 
appears this reform might not have been enough or in the right direction, since 
the SL numbers did not pick up in the years following its implementation. 
The need for separate legal treatment FEANSAL mentions is not an issue 
in the Basque Country since their autonomy has allowed the local government to 
regulate SLs separately. This is not the case for most of Spain given that taxation 
usually falls under the central government’s jurisdiction. 
This survey also brought to light a lack of information which might stem 
from a poor communication about the SL model. The survey found that 87.01% 
did not know about the R+D grants available through the Social Economy and 
Entrepreneurs Administration (Dirección General de Economía Social y Emprendedores). 
Moreover, the fact that 66.23% of respondents indicated the idea to create an SL 
came from external advisors suggests that potential entrepreneurs are not 
acquainted enough with the concept so as to start a business under this model 
on their own. It remains an open question whether this communication issue is 
only a problem within Andalusia, or it extends to the rest of the autonomous 
communities. The latter appears to be the case. 
 
3 Sociedades Laborales in the Basque Country 
 
The Basque Country is an especially interesting case to study and to 
compare with the rest of Spain. Due to its highly developed economy, employee 
ownership was studied in depth and regulated accordingly. Moreover, the 
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region’s tax autonomy allowed them to pass special legislation to encourage 
employee ownership and boost the SL model. Information on the Basque Country 
is also readily available both through the local statistics service (EUSTAT) and 
through non-profit organizations such as ASLE, whose aim is to support SLs by 
working side by side with them. 
 
3.1 Employee Participation in Gipuzkoa 
 
The Provincial Council of Gipuzkoa commissioned a study to consulting 
firm Ikei R&D to analyze people’s participation in Gipuzkoan companies. Their 
first report was issued in 2016 (Ikei R&C, 2016) and was the result of interviewing 
447 companies over the phone. These firms consisted of at least 20 employees, 
i.e. micro and some small businesses were not considered because Ikei 
considered smaller companies would more likely not be in a position to reflect on 
employee participation. 
The sample was comprised of 36.3% joint-stock companies, 43.7% limited 
liability companies, 10.6% cooperatives and 9.5% other legal forms. As for size, 
59.5% were small businesses, 31.3% fell under the medium category and 9.2% 
belonged into the large enterprise bracket. Most were in the industrial sector 
(60.9%), followed by those in the service sector (36%) and by construction firms 
(3.1%). 
The interview included a wide array of questions on the following topics: 
• Communication and information tools 
• Development of training activities 
• Participation in management 
• Economic participation 
• Performance and engagement assessment 
• Firm’s defining features 
Economic participation in this study is an umbrella term for profit 
participation, i.e., the right of employees to receive a variable share of the 
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company’s income, and equity participation, i.e. when employees invest capital 
in the company thus becoming shareholders (worker-owners). 
Ikei found that among the firms in the sample, 73% did not offer equity 
participation at all; 9.7% made it available for middle and upper management; 
7.2% made it available for whoever showed interest; and 10.1% had participation 
across the payroll. Regarding profit participation in the form of a variable pay 
salary structure, 24.5% calculated distribution among all employees based on the 
company’s overall performance; 9.2% did it based on team/department 
performance; and 8.9% factored in personal performance. 
When asked about the perception on the degree of development of their 
organization, results showed that the larger the company, the higher the number 
of respondents that answered “highly developed”: Among small companies (10-
49 employees), 19% chose that option; among small medium companies (50-99 
employees), 23.6%; and larger medium and larger companies (over 100 
employees) had the highest rate at 27%. This correlation between size and 
perceived development is explained, according to Ikei, by the fact that larger 
companies tend to have more resources to carry out projects on innovation, 
internationalization, and employee participation. “Advanced employee 
participation organization models are usually implemented when the firm reaches 
a relevant size.” (Ikei R&C, 2016). When analyzed against the different legal 
forms, cooperatives show the highest perceived development rate at 45.7%, 
followed by LLCs (23%) and joint-stock companies (12.7%). 
The study also surveyed more than 600 inhabitants of the Gipuzkoa region 
working in the private sector for companies of 5 or more employees. They were 
inquired about current capital participation and, where nonexistent, about interest 
in participating. 13.2% of respondents indicated they participated in the equity of 
the company they work at, and 23.4% of those without participation answered 
that they had interest. Regarding profit participation, 28.5% of respondents 
answered they participated in their company’s profits. 
Ikei also confirmed that there is a correlation between capital participation 
and the position occupied. 56.8% of executives answered they do participate, 
against 14.5% of middle management and 9.3% of non-managing workers. The 
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difference is less sharp when considering desire to participate: 41.2% of 
executives answered affirmatively, while 24.3% of middle management and 
22.4% of non-managing workers did so. At the same time, desire to participate in 
a company’s equity does not seem to correlate with the size of the company. 
According to Ikei’s findings, an average of 24.1% of respondents wishes to 
participate, with negligible differences among size brackets. 
Profit participation also correlates with the employee’s position: 48.6% of 
executives receive a variable share of the profits, while 25.8% of non-managing 
employees do so. On the other hand, the relationship between profit participation 
and company size is not that direct: Percentages range from 20.5% to 35.8% 
depending on the size bracket. 
Ikei also inquired about the perceived obstacles to both types of 
participation. In both cases, the need for a change of mindset is seen as one of 
the major hurdles, while complexity of implementation is ranked lower. This 
suggests the shift toward more employee participation in all its forms poses more 
psychological challenges than organizational ones. Due to how the sample is 
comprised mostly of conventional companies without participation, these 
answers reflect mostly the outlook of conventional companies eventually shifting 
toward a participatory model. Another interesting approach that was not included 
would be to consider the point of view of new entrepreneurs who must decide 
how to set up their company from the start as opposed to those that already have 
an ongoing business that would naturally offer more resistance to change. 
Although this study does not encompass the entirety of the Basque 
Country, Gipuzkoa is the second most populous province of the three that 
comprise this autonomous community, thus providing valuable insight on a 
significant part of the region. 
 
3.2 Tax Autonomy in the Basque Country 
 
Thanks to the Basque Economic Agreement, the region is in a privileged 
position to pass regulations to better achieve their goals. In this sense, they have 
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been able to outdo the public subsidies and modest tax incentives available at 
national level. 
In this sense, in 2016 Gipuzkoa’s provincial council passed law 6/2016 
(Diputación Foral de Gipuzkoa, 2016) in order to promote workers’ equity 
participation through tax incentives. This law sought to eliminate certain obstacles 
and simplify bureaucracy in order to adapt the model to the “current social reality” 
(Diputación Foral de Gipuzkoa, 2016). For instance, the requirements for tax 
exemption for retiring owners and transmitting entities became more flexible: 
• minimum age was lowered from 65 to 60, 
• the compulsory offer to all employees was eliminated, 
• the concept of an intermediary entities created exclusively to facilitate 
employee stock ownership was introduced. 
At the same time, the law also improved tax exemption limits: 
• tax deduction increased from 10% to 15% for male employees, 
• a special 20% tax deduction for female employees was introduced, 
• unused tax exemptions can be carried over for 4 years, 
• the cumulative tax deductions cap over consecutive fiscal years 
changed to €6,000 for male employees and €8,000 for female 
employees. 
These measures also make evident how the government of Gipuzkoa had 
gender equality in mind, since they tried to improve the presence of women in a 
male-dominated world by providing enhanced conditions for female worker-
owners. 
Four years later, the council of Gipuzkoa passed law 5/2020 (Diputación 
Foral de Gipuzkoa, 2020) to modify tax regulations in response to the Covid-19 
pandemic. Such swift reaction sought to encourage entrepreneurship during a 
time of economic hardship in the hope that companies and entrepreneurs would 
have a less difficult time adapting to the new reality. Specifically, the council 
lowered corporate income tax for the duration of 2020, introduced an 
extraordinary tax cut on 2019 taxes based on expected losses during 2020, and 
increased maximum the tax deductions granted for employment generation to 
€7,500 per person. Requirements to apply for tax deductions granted for setting 
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up a business were simplified, and incentives to help small businesses and 
individuals convert to a digital business model were put in place. 
Although this 2020 regulations did not specifically target SLs, they are 
further proof of the local government’s autonomy and its resulting agility to help 
their businesses when the surrounding environment factors change. 
 
3.3 Data Sources 
 
A considerable amount of data on SLs and conventional companies is 
readily available in the Basque Country both through the local statistics service 
and through non-profit organizations such as ASLE. 
EUSTAT is the official Basque statistics institute since 1986, and citizens 
and companies are obliged by law to collaborate with data collection to ensure 
the quantity and quality of information. The main aim of the agency is to meet the 
statistical information needs of citizens, companies, government agencies, and 
universities among others by undertaking operations to gather economic, social, 
environmental, and territorial data (Servicios de Información, n.d.). These 
operations are grouped into four-year plans according to what the government 
deems necessary. ASLE is a non-profit organization setup in 1982 with the 
purpose of supporting SLs and, more recently, participatory companies in the 
Basque Country (ASLE, 2018). Although they do not collaborate with all of them, 
they currently work with 309 companies, which is a considerable number when 
compared to the 741 SLs active in 2019. This close contact gives ASLE valuable 
insight on the current status of SLs and participatory companies and allows them 
to carry out additional studies to gather more information than that processed by 
EUSTAT. 
These sources are complemented by the national statistics service (INE) 
and the Ministry of Labor of Spain (MITRAMISS, formerly known as MEYSS), 
which collect similar data to that of EUSTAT at national level. Some of the data 
gathered by these agencies can be accessed through their websites, other is 
published by the Bank of Spain, and more specific data sets can be ordered to 
match special requirements. 
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IV. Research Design and Results 
 
 
1 Employment Generation and DCM 
 
In order to have a wider picture of how the population of SLs and 
conventional companies is performing and given the lack of a database 
containing longitudinal data for every existing company, I have analyzed 
aggregate data on employment change. By obtaining the number of companies 
and the number of those employed by these companies I have been able to study 
employment generation and, therefore, growth. In this sense, the creation of new 
companies is also considered growth as they add up to the total number of 
employees. 
Because of how the datasets are designed, employment can be studied 
per size bracket, showing whether micro, small, medium, and large companies 
are behaving in terms of growth. However, this poses an additional challenge: 
Since by growing or shrinking companies shift size categories, change can easily 
be assigned to the wrong size bracket.  
In order to solve this problem, the Dynamic Classification Method (DCM) 
was introduced by Davidsson (1996) and then reintroduced by de Wit & de Kok 
(2013). It was originally designed to accurately portray the number of jobs created 
by micro, small, medium, and large companies. As opposed to other previously 
used methods, DCM had two main advantages: 
• On the one hand, it fairly assigns each new job created (lost) to the size 
class in which said job was created (lost), thus accounting for those 
companies that cross boundaries in the process. For instance, if a micro 
company grows from 5 employees to 16 and thus crosses the 10-
employee boundary into the medium size category, DCM assigns 5 new 
jobs to the micro category (since those jobs were created while the 
company was of micro size) and 6 new jobs to the small-size bracket (since 
the company had already become small at the point it hired its 11th 
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employee). This is illustrated by Figure 9 below. Other pre-existing 
methods would have assigned all 11 new jobs to the initial size bracket in 
year 0 (micro) or to the final size bracket in year 1 (small), which distorts 
the results favoring one bracket over the other, a bias that exacerbates 
when companies do not grow linearly and fall back into a smaller size 
bracket. 
• On the other hand, DCM requires little information, namely “the 
employment level and the number of firms in each size class within each 
time period” (de Wit & de Kok, 2013). In other words, unlike in my simplified 
example from Figure 9, information at company level is not needed and 
aggregate data can be used. With only the number of people employed 
and the number of companies in each bracket, one can calculate the 
absolute employment change which, if positive, can be interpreted as 
growth. Then, with the initial number of employees, one can calculate the 
relative change, which can be interpreted as a growth rate. This rate can 
be compared between SLs and conventional firms, and also among the 
different size brackets to check whether growth behaves differently in any 
of the categories. 
For this analysis, annual data instead of quarterly is required; this is to 
remove temporary/seasonal job fluctuations that might affect statistics, leaving 
only permanent employment within the analysis. 
 
Figure 9 Dynamic Classification Method Example 
 
Note. Own elaboration. 
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1.1 Method Description 
 
At national level, I used data from MITRAMISS between 2011 and 2019 
containing the number of companies and number of employees on the last 
working day of every year. I obtained two main comparable datasets: one for 
active, qualified SLs and another for all types of businesses, including SLs. 
Within each dataset, companies were divided in 7 categories as follows: 
1. 1-2 workers 
2. 3-5 workers 
3. 6-9 workers 
4. 10-49 workers 
5. 50-249 workers 
6. 250-499 workers 
7. Over 499 workers 
I re-grouped them according to the size-bracket classification in order to 
make it comparable to other datasets as follows: 
1. Micro companies: 1-9 workers 
2. Small companies: 10-49 workers 
3. Medium companies: 50-249 workers 
4. Large companies: over 249 workers 
For reference, I calculated the average size of companies: 
 
Table 3 Average Size of Spanish Companies per Year 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
All companies 9.40 9.22 9.24 9.37 9.56 9.78 10.08 10.35 10.60 
SLs 5.53 5.49 5.61 5.87 6.25 6.53 6.87 7.13 7.39 




Although the overall population of companies displays a larger average 
size every year, SLs’ average size grew 33.6% from 2011 to 2019, while the 
average size of all companies grew 12.8% over the same period. 
Upon applying the DCM formula to re-allocate employment change, I 
obtained the following results: 
 
Table 4 Relative Employment Change in Spanish Companies (All Types) Corrected by DCM 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
TOTAL -5.25% -0.01% 2.18% 4.63% 4.28% 4.15% 4.24% 1.98% 
Micro (1-9) -8.55% 1.00% 1.53% 7.30% 5.35% 3.88% 4.46% 0.04% 
Small (10-49) -5.77% -0.90% 2.17% 4.70% 4.68% 4.40% 3.97% 1.89% 
Medium (50-249) -4.36% -0.71% 2.38% 4.06% 4.52% 4.72% 4.13% 2.73% 
Large (250+) -3.27% 0.15% 2.52% 3.17% 3.28% 3.92% 4.32% 2.80% 
Note. Own elaboration with data from MITRAMISS. 
 
The analysis of overall population of companies shows how employment 
shrank until 2013 and then started recovering until 2019, with the notable 




Table 5 Relative Employment Change in Spanish SLs Corrected by DCM 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
TOTAL -9.39% -5.89% 0.10% 1.49% -0.85% -0.73% -2.04% -3.05% 
Micro (1-9) -13.47% -8.46% -2.63% -1.40% -3.89% -3.94% -6.30% -8.61% 
Small (10-49) -7.78% -2.34% 1.09% 4.94% 2.16% 4.01% -0.52% -3.72% 
Med. (50-249) -0.53% -3.84% 6.00% 1.54% -2.22% -0.21% 1.10% 3.36% 
Large (250+) 4.40% -3.37% 8.02% 7.57% 7.24% -1.03% 9.12% 14.64% 
Note. Own elaboration with data from MITRAMISS. 
 
SLs, on the other hand, show that employment generation recovered the 
most in larger-sized companies, while micro enterprises were affected the most 
and do not display any positive numbers. 
For the Basque Country, I used data from EUSTAT between 2010 and 
2019 that includes the number of companies and number of employees on 
January 1st of every year. I obtained two main comparable datasets: one for 
active, qualified SLs and another for conventional businesses, excluding SLs. I 
combined both to obtain the data for the complete population of companies and 
thus make it comparable with that of Spain. I also shifted the years to make up 
for the registration date difference (last working day vs. January 1st). 
Within each dataset, companies were divided in 7 categories as follows: 
1. 1-2 workers 
2. 3-5 workers 
3. 6-9 workers 
4. 10-14 workers 
5. 15-19 workers 
6. 20-49 workers 
7. Over 50 workers 
I re-grouped the data received according to the size-bracket classification 
as follows: 
1. Micro companies: 1-9 workers 
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2. Small companies: 10-49 workers 
3. Medium and large companies: over 49 workers 
As for the average company size per year, the results are presented below 
in Table 6 below: 
 
Table 6 Average Size of Basque Companies per Year 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
All companies 9.52 9.36 9.61 9.78 9.62 9.46 9.64 9.90 10.23 10.41 
SLs 9.96 9.80 8.45 8.66 8.20 7.93 8.47 8.77 9.32 9.90 
Note. Own elaboration with data from EUSTAT. 
 
After applying the DCM formula to re-assign employment change, I 
obtained the following table indicating relative employment generation by all 
companies per size bracket in the Basque Country: 
 
Table 7 Relative Employment Change in Basque Companies (All Types) Corrected by DCM 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
TOTAL -2.90% -3.80% -2.59% -2.66% -1.41% 1.67% 2.73% 2.47% 3.39% 
Micro -5.33% -8.82% -6.90% -5.49% -3.15% -0.09% 2.61% 1.52% 3.30% 
Small -2.52% -3.18% -4.05% -3.99% -0.84% 1.79% 3.00% 2.48% 3.22% 
Medium 
& Large -1.89% -1.60% 0.54% -0.43% -0.92% 2.45% 2.62% 2.89% 3.54% 
Note. Own elaboration with data from EUSTAT. 
 
A clear distinction can be made between the 2010-2014 and 2015-2018 
periods, the former being one of economic downturn after the 2008 financial 




Table 8 Relative Employment Change in Basque SLs Corrected by DCM 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
TOTAL -9.16% -22.81% -4.21% -7.84% -4.89% 4.17% -2.77% 2.00% 1.44% 
Micro -15.32% -17.56% -10.26% -8.76% -8.07% -1.37% -8.32% -1.85% -2.65% 
Small -8.14% -7.83% -3.92% -6.90% -4.08% 6.09% -0.33% 4.12% 4.12% 
Medium 
& Large -5.25% -40.57% 2.53% -8.10% -2.19% 8.41% 0.00% 3.46% 2.13% 
Note. Own elaboration with data from EUSTAT. 
 
Relative employment change in SLs also displays a period of economic 
hardship until 2014, which continues to be the case for micro SLs until 2018. Only 





A few caveats are attached to the DCM analysis. First, because it only 
requires aggregate data, it poses the question of what should be considered 
growth. Since all companies are analyzed as a group, employment generation 
represents the growth of that group, but there is no way of knowing whether 
growth comes from newly created companies that outnumber those that close 
down, or from the consistent growth of a group of companies over time. 
Second, this analysis does not account for disqualified SLs that continue 
to operate encouraging employee ownership but without the legal qualification. 
This is due to the lack of tracking of participatory companies on behalf of the 
statistics service providers in Spain. In the end, only qualified SLs are shown as 
such, and when they disqualify, they are included under the conventional 
company’s category, thus skewing the results in favor of conventional companies 
that do not encourage employee participation of any type. 
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Third, despite working with official datasets from the same country, there 
are some differences between them regarding how data is collected and 
classified. In this case, the size brackets were not identical: in the Basque 
Country, large and medium companies had to be grouped together. Moreover, 
the date on which data is collected for each year was also different in each 
jurisdiction. Thus, adjustments had to be made. 
Finally, because this method utilizes data on employment, it does not 
include workers hired under the autonomous regime, i.e. workers without a 
permanent work contract. I thus assume the number of workers under said 
regime is similar for both types of companies and thus the datasets remain 
comparable. I also assume that growth is better represented by the hiring of 
permanent employees rather than by temporary, external workers who might be 
needed as an answer to an occasional or seasonal peak in activity. This has been 




The average size of SLs in Spain is growing faster than that of 
conventional companies. At the same time, larger SLs are generating more 
employment and recovered better after the crisis when compared to smaller SLs. 
This phenomenon combined with the decline in newly registered SLs indicates 
that even though the concept is losing popularity, existing SLs are growing at a 
faster pace than their conventional counterparts. 
In the Basque Country, the overall size of SLs has remained fairly stable, 
similarly to that of conventional companies. SLs in the Basque Country also 
display higher employment loss during the crisis years, after which small, 
medium, and large SLs recovered, but only small SLs outperformed their 
conventional counterparts in terms of employment generation. 
Upon comparing the Basque Country with the entirety of Spain, both 
jurisdictions display a fairly stable average of 9-11 employees per company. On 
the other hand, when comparing the average size of SLs, Basque companies 
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tend to hire more employees than SLs in the rest of Spain, although this 
difference is growing smaller every year. 
 
2 Cohort Analysis in the Basque Country 
 
EUSTAT studies company survival rates, and in order to do so, they keep 
track of cohorts, i.e. companies registered on the same year, and publish data on 
how many are active after four years and how many employees are on their 
payroll. With this information I was able to separate those companies that 
survived four years, analyze how much they grew over that time span, and 
compare how SLs performed against conventional companies. 
The main difference between this method and the DCM analysis is that, 
while the latter measured growth within a changing population of companies, the 
former allows to look into a fixed number of surviving companies over time. The 
effect is twofold: It weeds out all inactive companies (those that failed to survive 
four years) and it separates the group from newly registered firms. As a result, 
growth rates obtained arise from the expansion or contraction of the same group 
of firms, rather than from the creation or dissolution of other companies. By 
filtering the survival factor out of the equation, this approach provides accurate 
data on how companies generate employment and grow in the four years 
following the year of their first registration. 
 
2.1 Method Description 
 
I retrieved data on cohorts 2004 through 2014. Information on earlier 
cohorts was not available and more recent cohorts had not yet been in operation 
enough years at the time of data collection. Information on cohorts 2004 through 
2006 was incomplete, as it only included data on year zero and four but not about 
some intermediate years. Data collection point is January 1st of every year. 
The dataset contained the number of employees in the year of registration 
and the subsequent four years (except for cohorts 2004-2006). Companies were 
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separated into four categories: conventional joint-stock companies (SA), 
conventional limited liability companies (LLC), and their SL counterparts (SAL 
and SLL). I regrouped them in two: conventional firms and SLs. 
Two main approaches to this data analysis were adopted. For the first, I 
effaced external environment conditions bound to the ongoing time period and 
studied growth in SLs and conventional firms from year zero to year four; this 
allowed me to analyze growth at a more abstract level. In this case, only data for 
cohorts 2007-2014 was utilized because it included all the intermediate years. 
For the second approach, I studied cohorts through the actual fiscal years, which 
allowed me to identify four distinct sets according to the moment of registration in 
relation to the 2008 financial crisis; the performance of these sets was then 




Figure 10 Yearly Average Size of 5-Year-Old Basque Companies 
 




Figure 10 shows the average size of Basque firms that survived their first 
four years of operation after registration. SLs are on average around 20% larger 
than their conventional counterparts, although this difference is reduced to 14% 
upon approaching year four. The graph also shows that SLs grow faster until year 
two, but then they slow down when compared to conventional firms. By year two, 
SLs typically grow 21.6% while conventional firms grow 14.7% when compared 
to their size in year zero. By year three, however, conventional companies take 
the lead, and their size is 22.7% larger than in registration year, while SLs display 
a growth of 14.6%. 
Upon analyzing each cohort independently, four groups were identified 
according to when registration took place in relation to the 2008 financial crisis: 
1. Firms registered prior to the crisis and that only were exposed to its 
effects on the final years of the five-year period under analysis. This 
group includes the 2004 and 2005 cohorts. 
2. Firms registered before the crisis that experienced the full blow 
within the five-year period. This group includes cohorts 2006, 2007 
and 2008. 
3. Firms registered after the crisis onset and during the ensuing 
economic downturn and, therefore, with previous knowledge on the 
situation. This category includes cohorts 2009, 2010, 2011 and 
2012. 
4. Firms registered after the economic downturn when signs of 
recovery started showing. This group includes cohorts 2013 and 
2014. 
The relative change in average size between year one and year five is 




Table 9 Relative Change in Average Size of Basque Companies per Cohort after Five Years 
Cohort Conventional Laborales 
F2004-2008 49% 60% 
F2005-2009 14% 26% 
F2006-2010 18% -11% 
F2007-2011 23% 15% 
F2008-2012 12% -19% 
F2009-2013 -30% 6% 
F2010-2014 13% 149% 
F2011-2015 19% 107% 
F2012-2016 29% 46% 
F2013-2017 27% 79% 
F2014-2018 69% 100% 
Note. Own elaboration with data from EUSTAT. 
 
In the first group (blue) of companies that were registered prior to the 2008 
financial crisis, Sociedades Laborales in the 2004 and 2005 cohorts outgrew their 
conventional counterparts by 11 and 12 percentage points, respectively. The 
impact of the crisis was mostly toward the end of the five-year period under 
analysis. 
In the second group of companies registered prior to the crisis (and, 
therefore, unaware of what was ahead), all three cohorts of conventional firms 
outperformed SLs. These companies were affected by the crisis in most of their 
first five years of operation. While conventional companies still show a positive 
relative change, SLs shrank. 
In the third group, comprised of companies registered during the economic 
downturn that ensued, SLs outgrew conventional companies in all three cohorts. 
It is worth noting that the 2009 cohort is the only one in which conventional 
companies display a negative relative size change. 
Finally, among the group of companies registered during the recovery 
period, even though conventional companies improved, they were still 
outperformed by SLs registered in 2013 and 2014, which display rates 51 and 31 
percentage points above those of conventional companies. 
Given that companies that went out of businesses are not taken into 
account in this analysis, it is possible that a reason why the only period in which 
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conventional firms outperformed SLs (i.e. those cohorts registered without 
knowledge on the imminent crisis and whose first years were the most affected 
by the economic downturn) is that conventional companies did not survive the 
crisis altogether while SLs were able to remain in business while shrinking their 
payroll. This could not be fully verified: The necessary data was not available for 
the 2006 cohorts. The 2007 cohorts displayed similar survival rates (68.5% for 
conventional firms and 65.3% for SLs), while the 2008 cohorts did show a 
significant difference that seemed to support my hypothesis: a 61% survival rate 




3 Case Studies 
 
Basque non-profit organization ASLE works for the promotion, protection 
and strengthening of SLs and participatory companies (ASLE, 2018). Through 
them, I was able to look into some of the companies they work/worked with to 
achieve these goals. 
These predominantly qualitative case studies include both joint-stock 
companies and limited liability entities. They are mostly from the service and 
industry sectors, and perform diverse economic activities: from landscaping 
services, to production of steel tools. Age-wise, the group is also varied: some 
have a decades-long history, while a software consultancy company was founded 
in 2013. 
The most notable distinction, however, is whether they maintained their SL 
qualification or not at the moment of analysis. In this sense, only one firm opted 
for disqualification and, unfortunately, no information since they started operating 
as a conventional firm could be gathered. I therefore ignore whether they 
transitioned into being a participatory company, maintaining some degree of 
employee participation, or whether they completely switched into the traditional 
capitalist model. Data on all cases was first gathered in 2016, followed by a 2019 
update that excluded the disqualified firm. 
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Each case study contains a brief description and history of the firm, 
followed by financial, employment and ownership longitudinal data. Some of the 
ratios and indicators are compared with the sector average for reference. When 
possible, this comparison was made both with the sector in the Basque Country 
and the sector in all of Spain. 
The financial indicators included are the following: 
• EBITDA Margin: (=EBITDA/sales) the operating profit of the 
company as a percentage of its total revenue. By using this relative 
profitability, I am able to compare the performance of companies 
regardless of their size and the capacity of their operations to 
generate funds for potential re-investment. 
• Indebtedness Ratio: (=liabilities/assets) the percentage of the 
company’s assets that are funded through debt. With this indicator 
I can study whether the company relies on external funds in order 
to support its operation and growth (if any) as opposed to relying on 
capital from investors. 
• Financial Profitability: (=net income/equity) return on equity 
investments, i.e., the financial performance of the company 
measured in how much profit is generated per euro invested. The 
higher the ratio, the better the capital of the company is managed 
and, therefore, the more likely the company is to grow. 
• Productivity (of HR): (=net income/HR expenses) net-profit-per-
euro-of-payroll ratio. This indicator provides insight on the 
productivity in human resources management; a higher ratio could 
translate into potential for growth, while a lower one might suggest 
the payroll needs to be restructured. 
Each indicator tends to behave differently depending on the main activity 
the firm performs, which is why I focused the analysis not on a comparison across 
cases but with each company’s sector. Being individual case studies, data is not 
representative of the population of companies to which they belong. However, 
the availability of disaggregate, longitudinal data offers deeper insight into the SL 
model and its impact on these particular firms. 
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3.1 Existing SLs 
 
Komunikazio Biziagoa SAL: This joint-stock company in the publishing 
business was founded in 1998 as a worker-owned company, although its origin 
can be traced back to 1919 when they started publishing a religious magazine in 
the Basque language. 13 of the original partners capitalized their unemployment 
benefits, each of them contributing €3,000; over the years, more worker-owners 
joined and did the same. 
This is a case in which the SL model was particularly beneficial due to the 
company’s industry. Given that the company is in the publishing industry and its 
mission is to inform Basque citizens, they stand out from other companies by 
using employee ownership as a way to ensure independence of thought. 
Consequently, being a completely flat organization in which most workers are 
owners, they ensure that their publications are bias-free. 
 
Table 10 Komunikazio Biziagoa’s Financial Indicators Compared to Sector Averages in Spain and 




Sector average (Spain) 
2018 
Sector average 
(Basque C.) 2016 
EBITDA margin 1.82% 7.31% 19% 
Indebtedness ratio 25.9% 44.37% 45% 
Financial profitability 1.61% 4.63% 5.42% 
Productivity 1.7% 9.12% 31% 
Company sector: NACE - J 5814 - Publishing of journals and periodicals 
Sector for Spain: NACE - J 58 – Publishing activities 
Sector for Basque Country: 22 - Publishing, imagery, radio y television (A38) / 59 - Publishing (A86)1 
Note. Own elaboration with data obtained through ASLE from Komunikazio Biziagoa SAL’s annual 
accounts and the annual accounts of sector companies submitted to the Trade Register in Spain (and 
obtained through the Bank of Spain) and to EUSTAT (Basque Country). 
 
Upon analyzing Table 10 above, it becomes clear that in 2018 this SAL 
was financially outperformed by other Spanish companies in the sector. Figures 
for the Basque sector in the same period were not available; instead, I included 
the most recent data (2016) only for reference purposes. 
 
1  Balance sheet for sector “22 - Publishing, imagery, radio y television” as per classification A38; income statement for 
sector “59 - Publishing (A86)” as per classification A86. Source: Basque Statistics Institute. 
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Regarding growth, Komunikazio did not increase its payroll in the 2007-
2018 period and has remained stable in size after the crisis, which took a severe 
toll on its employees (especially those who were not owners). However, when 
analyzing the number of worker-owners, the company displays an increase in the 
2009-2011 period. Consequently, the proportion of employees who are not 
workers has reduced. Komunikazio Biziagoa has remained in the small size 
bracket throughout the years under analysis, as can be seen in Figure 11 below. 
 
Figure 11 Number of Workers and Worker-Owners at Komunikazio Biziagoa (2007-2018) 
 
Note. Own elaboration with data obtained through ASLE from Komunikazio Biziagoa SAL 
 
Gran Sol SLL: This limited liability company was created in 2012 and 
belongs to the music distribution sector. One of the four founding partners 
capitalized their unemployment benefits to invest them in the company. However, 
the main incentive to become an SL was setting up a company with a democratic 
structure: Every member held one fourth of the social capital at the start and then, 
when a worker left in 2016, each partner held one third, maintaining equality 
among them. One of the company’s most remarkable indicators is the productivity 
ratio (income/staff costs), which has been growing from 0.27 in 2012 to 6.24 in 










Sector average (Spain) 
2018 
Sector average 
(Basque C.) 2016 
EBITDA margin 1% 4% 11% 
Indebtedness ratio 87% 55% 53% 
Financial profitability 0% 26% 1% 
Productivity 624% 108% 1% 
Company sector: NACE - G 4652 - Wholesale of electronic and telecommunications equipment and parts 
Sector for Spain: NACE - G 46 – Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
Sector for Basque Country: Information Technology2 
Note. Own elaboration with data obtained through ASLE from Gran Sol SLL’s annual accounts and 
the annual accounts of sector companies submitted to the Trade Register in Spain (and obtained through 
the Bank of Spain) and to EUSTAT (Basque Country). 
  
When compared to the sector in Spain (refer to Table 11), Gran Sol had a small 
EBITDA margin in 2018. However, due to the small size of the company, it is 
incredibly productive in terms of human resources. Data for the Basque Country 
for 2018 was not available, so the most recent indicators (2016) were included 
for reference. 
 
Figure 12 Number of Workers and Worker-Owners at Gran Sol (2012-2018) 
  
Note. Own elaboration with data obtained through ASLE from Gran Sol SLL 
 
2 Balance sheet for sector “24 – Information Technology” as per classification A38; 
income statement for sector “62 – Information Technology” as per classification A86. Source: 
Basque Statistics Institute. 
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As for size (refer to Figure 12), Gran Sol is a micro company that has never 
grown into a larger bracket. In fact, the only change is negative: A worker-owner 
left the company, and their shares were equally distributed among the remaining 
owners. Even though the company does experience surges in its workload, these 
are seasonal (three peaks a year) and are therefore solved by outsourcing part 
of the work rather than increasing their payroll. 
Hirunox Calderería Inoxidable SLL: This limited liability company 
specialises in boiler making, manufacturing, assembly and installation of metal 
structures, metal carpentry and associated engineering services. It was founded 
in 2012 by three partners who capitalized their unemployment benefits after the 
liquidation of their previous employer. 
 
Table 12 Hirunox’s Financial Indicators Compared to Sector Average in the Basque Country 
Financial ratios 
Hirunox Calderería Inoxidable 
2018 
Sector average (Basque 
Country) 
 
EBITDA margin -40% 11.42% (2018) 
Indebtedness ratio 32% 55.9% (2017) 
Financial profitability -12% 8.6% (2017) 
Productivity 108% 126% (2016) 
Company sector: NACE – C 2573 - Manufacture of tools 
Sector for Basque Country: 10 – Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment 
Note. Own elaboration with data obtained through ASLE from Hirunox Calderería Inoxidable SLL’s 
annual accounts and the annual accounts of sector companies submitted to EUSTAT (Basque Country). 
 
According to ASLE, 2018 was an exceptionally difficult year for Hirunox 
due to issues with one of their main clients, which would explain the negative 
figures. As seen in Table 12, their financial performance that year was lower than 
the sector average and their EBITDA margin was nowhere near the 11.42% 
average in the rest of the Basque Country. Other indicators for the area were not 




Figure 13 Number of Workers and Worker-Owners at Hirunox (2012-2018) 
 
Note. Own elaboration with data obtained through ASLE from Hirunox Calderería Inoxidable SLL 
 
In terms of growth, the company has remained a micro company since 
2012, with a stable number of employees and worker-owners since 2013 (refer 
to Figure 13). According to ASLE, management has expressed their concerns 
about the limitations on non-partner worker hours imposed by the SL legislation. 
The company also fears accepting more partners from the existing pool of 
employees could potentially be a setback for the agility of their decision-making 
process. 
Kimu Bat SLL: Its origins can be traced back to 1991, when they operated 
as a flower and plant shop. The company grew and it was registered as a limited 
liability company with four founding partners. Their array of services expanded to 
landscaping and horticulture, where innovation is a key to their success. 
Moreover, Kimu Bat was able to take on larger projects thanks to the boom in 
construction and real estate, which helped their growth. This favorable situation 
faded with the 2008 financial crisis, which affected real estate the most. In order 
to pull through, the company decided to maintain their human resources, thus 
increasing the sense of belonging in the team. In 2013, the company was at risk, 
and the owners and employees jointly decided to share ownership to ensure 
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business continuity, resulting in its registration as an SL in 2014. 16 worker-
owners have capitalized their unemployment benefits, contributing an average of 
€15,000 each. 
 





Sector average (Spain) 
2018 
Sector average 
(Basque C.) 2017 
EBITDA margin 4.48% 3.85% n/a 
Indebtedness ratio 62.91% 63.13% 39.6% 
Financial profitability -2.53% 10.76% n/a 
Productivity -1.41% 3.3% n/a 
Company sector: NACE - N 8130 – Landscape service activities 
Sector for Spain: NACE - N 81 – Services to buildings and landscape activities 
Sector for Basque Country: 30 – Ancillary services3 
Note. Own elaboration with data obtained through ASLE from Kimu Bat SLL’s annual accounts and 
the annual accounts of sector companies submitted to the Trade Register in Spain (and obtained through 
the Bank of Spain) and to EUSTAT (Basque Country). 
  
As shown in Table 13, Kimu Bat’s EBITDA margin was higher than the 
sector average in Spain, while their indebtedness ratio is similar. Their financial 
profitability and productivity were nonetheless negative and lower than that of the 
sector. Unfortunately, sector data for the Basque Country was not available and 
only the indebtedness ratio for 2017 could be included for reference purposes. 
 
3  Balance sheet for sector “30 – Ancillary services” as per classification A38; income statement for the sector was not 
available. Source: Basque Statistics Institute. 
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Figure 14 Number of Workers and Worker-Owners at Kimu Bat (2014-2018) 
 
Note. Own elaboration with data obtained through ASLE from Kimu Bat SLL 
  
As for growth, since their registration as a SL, Kimu has displayed sustained 
growth both in the number of workers and in the number of worker-owners. The 
company had no buyouts and no reductions in their payroll. It is still far, however, 
from crossing over to the medium size bracket. 
Izar Cutting Tools SAL: The company’s origin dates back to the beginning 
of the 20th century when it produced steel crossbows for carriages. Until the 
1980s, the company did well by relying on the quality and innovation of the cutting 
tools it produced, allowing it to overcome the economic crisis of the 1970s. In 
1988, the company was sold and the new owner, whose indifference drove the 
company to the ground. In 1993, the firm was turned into a SAL to ensure its 
continuity; 43% of the workers were laid off in the process. In 1996, the company 
was still struggling, and more capital was needed. A new SAL was created the 
following year, accompanied by a new feasibility plan. Additional founding was 
possible in 1998 thanks to the capitalization of unemployment benefits. By 1999, 




Table 14 Izar Cutting Tools’ Financial Indicators Compared to Sector Averages in the Basque 
Country 
Financial ratios 
Izar Cutting Tools 
2018 
Sector average (Basque 
Country) 
 
EBITDA margin 13.2% 11.42% (2018) 
Indebtedness ratio 31.08% 55.9% (2017) 
Financial profitability 9.9% 8.6% (2017) 
Productivity 152% 126% (2016) 
Company sector: NACE – C 2573 - Manufacture of tools 
Sector for Basque Country: 10 – Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment 
Note. Own elaboration with data obtained through ASLE from Izar Cutting Tools SAL’s annual 
accounts and the annual accounts of sector companies submitted to EUSTAT (Basque Country). 
 
As displayed in Table 14, in 2018 Izar outperformed the sector in the 
Basque Country in terms of EBITDA margin. Unfortunately, other sector 
indicators were only available for previous years and, thus, were only included 
for reference purposes. 
 
Figure 15 Number of Workers and Worker-Owners at Izar Cutting Tools (2012-2018) 
 
Note. Own elaboration with data obtained through ASLE from Izar Cutting Tools SAL 
71 
 
In the past few years, Izar has been a medium company. Since 2013 it 
shows a slight though steady growth in the number of workers which has brought 
it closer to crossing over the 250-boundary into the large company bracket. The 
number of worker-owners has remained even more stable and did not follow the 
slight increase in payroll of the past few years. 
 
3.2 Former SL and Potential Participatory Company 
 
Arima Software Design SLL: This limited liability company was founded as 
an SL in 2013 with five founders and no external investment, meaning it was 
based on the contributions of all five owners. The company was disqualified in 
February 2016 because of the limitation to hire new workers. They were reluctant 
to incorporate more owners to maintain the minimum 51% employee ownership 
requirement for fear it would affect their management and decision-making 
process. This is the best example of an SL that was a victim of its own success 
during its initial years. Another important aspect is that none of the founders 
capitalized their unemployment benefits, meaning the SL model was not taken 
advantage of to its full potential. 
Figure 16 Number of Workers and Worker-Owners at Arima Software Design (2013-2016) 
 
Note. Own elaboration with data obtained through ASLE from Arima SLL 
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As made evident in Figure 16, Arima quadrupled its size during its years 
as an SL, while the number of partners stayed the same. Unfortunately, no 
information could be obtained about its later years as a conventional company; 
therefore, I cannot know if they continued as a participatory company or they 
maintained a clear-cut separation between owners and employees. 
An interesting point that arises from this case is motivation to grow. Since 
the company prioritized growth over the SL qualification, it becomes clear that the 
owners had growth as one of their objectives. Being one of the entrepreneur 
factors that determine the most whether a firm grows, I wonder whether the other 
companies that are still qualified are motivated to grow and therefore actively 
seek it, or whether they are satisfied with the current size of their business. As 







1 SLs vs Conventional Companies in Spain 
 
Spanish companies in the last decade had a stable average size at around 
10 employees each. SLs, on the other hand, were always below that level but 
their average size has been increasing at a faster rate, potentially catching up 
with other companies in the coming years. 
Although one could think that this is a positive sign for SLs, in combination 
with other data, I can arrive at the opposite conclusion, that the average size is 
growing as the result of a type of legal entity that is losing popularity, therefore 
having fewer registrations every year and, as a result, fewer smaller companies 
with the potential to grow. This is further supported by the DCM analysis: After 
2014, employment generation across all types of companies and sizes recovered 
in Spain, while in SLs it only picked up in larger firms, with micro companies 
displaying negative values every year. 
It remains to be seen whether these results are due to a model that is 
flawed in itself. In theory, the model appears to positively affect most growth 
factors in a way that would help companies flourish, but in reality, the employment 
generation numbers do not go in this direction and do not show signs of growth. 
While a study encompassing all Spain would be required to arrive to a nation-
wide conclusion, FEANSAL (2012) already hinted in 2012 in Andalusia that 
issues underlying the SL model might be due to its implementation, since many 
ignore all the benefits that are available to qualified companies. This suggests 
employment generation might be hindered not by SLs that do not grow but by 
new enterprises that are undertaken under a different type of legal entity. 
Another aspect that suggests the SL model helps growth is that medium 
and large SLs are indeed generating employment at excellent rates according to 
the DCM analysis. Ideally, a cohort analysis like that of the Basque Country would 
shed light on the issue. 
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Disqualified SLs remain a mystery, as data is not systematically collected 
in Spain, but an analysis of what happens with those companies and whether 
they continue to operate as participated companies would be interesting to find 
out whether they 1. survive, 2. continue to foster employee participation, and 3. 
grow. This is the missing piece in the SL puzzle that I need to fully analyze their 
potential as business incubators. 
What is clear after the data analysis is that the 2015 law did not help SLs 
enough. New registrations did not pick up, smaller SLs struggled to generate 
employment, and if growth does happen, then it might take place after 
disqualification when no data is currently available to assess the performance of 
would-be participatory companies. 
 
2 Growth of SLs in the Basque Country 
 
Employment generation data in out DCM analysis has shown that Basque 
SLs struggled more than conventional companies during crisis years as they 
proportionately lost more jobs. After 2014, however, small SLs recovered and 
generated more employment in relative terms than their conventional 
counterparts. Medium and large companies also display positive numbers, 
although a comparison might not be fair given the small number of SLs in this 
category. One of the most salient results is the lower performance of micro SLs 
when compared to conventional micro firms, which up to 2013 could be 
interpreted as companies shrinking or disappearing, but from that moment 
onward, it could also be a reflection of the strong decline in new SL registrations 
that ensued and that continues to this day. 
The fact that the average size of SLs remains stable is a good sign in terms 
of growth, although it does not counter the fact that the SL model in the Basque 
Country is declining in popularity despite the efforts of the government to support 
it. The impact of the 2016 tax reform in the Basque Country is mostly visible in 
the relative employment generation numbers of 2017 and 2018, when compared 
with those of Spain: While Spain’s numbers are negative, Basque SLs did 
generate employment. Thus, although the 2016 reform did not encourage 
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entrepreneurs to register businesses as qualified SLs, it may have helped existing 
businesses. This is questioned by the fact that while the employment generation 
by Basque SLs outperformed that of Spanish SLs, Basque SLs do not seem to 
have outperformed Basque conventional companies in employment generation, 
thus casting doubts on the role of the 2016 reform. Moreover, while the average 
size of SLs did increase after 2016 and continued to do so thereafter, this 
phenomenon could also be the result of the sustained decrease in number of new 
micro-SLs (which drives the average size up). 
 
Figure 17 Relative Growth of Five-Year-Old Conventional Basque Firms - Cohorts 2004-2014 
 
Note. Own elaboration with data from EUSTAT. 
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Figure 18 Relative Growth of Five-Year-Old Basque SLs - Cohorts 2004-2014 
 
Note. Own elaboration with data from EUSTAT. 
 
The cohort analysis provided me with a clear picture of how Basque 
companies grow in their first five years after registration. In general, all cohorts 
have performed better on average during their first three years (years 0, 1 and 
2), but then their growth rate was surpassed by that of conventional companies. 
Thanks to the way the data set is designed, I can rule out bankruptcy and 
disqualification as potential causes. Instead, actual growth stagnation is 
happening in these companies that survive at least four years after registration. 
One possible interpretation is that the limitations imposed by the SL model 
are reached at year three, and then companies choose to remain qualified but 
with a slower growth rate or they prioritize growth and give up their SL 
qualification. The latter are unfortunately invisible in my thesis, as no database 
on disqualified companies is currently available. However, this is backed up by 
my case studies: while they are not representative of the whole population, they 
all follow the same trend. Those that are still qualified SLs display slow growth 
rates (if any), while the only case study (Arima) with a significant growth rate 
quickly opted out of the program with prospects of continued growth. 
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When studying cohorts within the timeframe they evolved in, I have found 
that during those first years, SLs outperformed conventional firms when the 
economic situation was positive or, if negative, it was known to them. This last 
scenario was the case of group number three (cohorts 2009-2012), consisting of 
firms founded during years of economic hardship but therefore knowledgeable of 
what the situation was, as opposed to group number two (cohorts 2006-2008), 
which struggled to adapt to the unexpected. With this data, I can arrive at two 
opposite conclusions: First, a positive one for SLs, in which even though group 
number two shrank in size, at least it survived, while conventional firms grew 
because I am only looking at those that survived to make it into my test group; or 
second, that those SLs in group number two were not fast enough to adapt to the 
unexpected changes in the economic environment as opposed to conventional 
firms. Data on survival rates for these years would help untangle this issue but it 
was not fully available for this thesis to arrive at a firm conclusion. 
In the cohort analysis, the effect of the 2016 tax reform on surviving 
companies might explain their outperforming of conventional firms, although 
causality is not that clear since the 2010 cohort also displays a remarkable 
increase in size in the 2010-2015 period, prior to the reform. 
 
3 SLs in Spain vs SLs in the Basque Country 
 
Unlike in all of Spain, despite the loss of popularity and drop in 
registrations, SLs in the Basque Country have a similar average size to that of 




Figure 19 Yearly Average Size of Companies in Spain and the Basque Country 
 
Note. Own elaboration with data from MITRAMISS and EUSTAT. 
 
Since a cohort analysis in Spain was not possible, this comparison can 
only be done in terms of growth as employment generation as per the DCM 
analysis. The first coincidence is the loss of employment by micro-SLs, which 
remains a constant for every year in both jurisdictions, possibly because both 
display a decline in new SL registrations. It could also be a consequence of 
smaller firms’ greater vulnerability to their surroundings due to their limited ability 
to modify their environment, a factor described in Fadahunsi (2012). 
Related to this point is the fact that although micro-SLs in both jurisdictions 
should have better access to capital thanks to the possibility to share ownership 
and to capitalize on unemployment benefits, they did not outperform their 
conventional counterparts in employment generation, setting an example 
contrary to Fadahunsi’s statement that “small businesses in which owners are 




In terms of overall employment in all types of companies, the Basque 
Country had positive employment change numbers in 2015 and not earlier in 
2014 like Spain. Moreover, employment generation in the Basque Country has 
been more modest than in the rest of the country. A possible reason behind this 
phenomenon is that in 2008, prior to the crisis, the activities that employed the 
most people were the manufacturing industry (23% of all active population), 
commerce (16%), and construction (11%). While high industrialization levels like 
those in the Basque Country are one of the factors that positively influence 
growth, industry was severely affected by the crisis together with commerce and 
construction. Recovery required a re-structuring of the economic activities and, 
in 2019, the activities with the most employees in the region were manufacturing 
(19%), commerce (14%) and health and social services (10%), while construction 
was in 7th place with 6%. Activities that grew in relative terms are tourism, 
professional services, administrative services, education, entertainment, and 
other services. On the other hand, employment in 2008 in the rest of Spain did 
not rely so heavily on construction (7%) and manufacturing (12%) and was more 
evenly distributed among the other areas. This difference and the subsequent 
change required had both a direct and indirect impact on SLs: It directly affected 
those firms associated with the most affected sectors (e.g. Kimu Bat) and it 
indirectly affected the others by slowing down economic activity in general. 
When comparing employment generation but only in SLs, the situation is 
slightly different: While Spanish SLs display the first positive number in 2014, they 
show negative numbers again between 2016-2019, possibly due to the drop in 
new SL registrations. In the Basque Country, however, employment generation 
was positive in 2015 (a year later than in Spain) but years 2017 and 2018 were 
positive as well, as opposed to the situation in the rest of the nation that showed 
employment loss. This is despite the drop in new SL registrations. While this 
could be interpreted as a positive outcome of the 2016 tax reforms to boost 
employee participation, this is called into question by the fact that Basque SLs 
did not outperform Basque conventional companies in terms of relative 
employment generation. 
Given the differences in the composition of the economic activity in Spain 
and the Basque Country, it is difficult to assess with the data that I gathered 
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whether their exercise of their tax autonomy through tax modifications helped 
them adapt to the new environment better than the rest of the country and 
whether this translated into more employment generation and growth. Perhaps 
this could be studied by analyzing the 2020 tax reforms that followed the Covid-
19 pandemic, but this is a topic for another study when the necessary data 
becomes available. On the other hand, when analyzing the average size of 
Basque and Spanish SLs (refer to Figure 19 above), there is a notable difference 
over the last decade in favor of Basque SLs. This difference does not exist when 
comparing all Basque companies against all Spanish companies, thus 
suggesting it is not the overall economic situation but rather the specific SL 
framework that is making a difference. 
A similarity between the SL model in both jurisdictions is that, despite not 
having a study on disqualified companies like the one from Andalusia, it seems 
that both in the Basque Country and in all of Spain, further changes are needed 
to revive the SL model and boost employee participation in all its forms. I believe 
by studying those that disqualify, their reasons, and whether they continue to 
support employee participation to some degree afterward or not is the key to 
finding out if the SL model is flawed or it just requires better communication to 







1 General Conclusions 
 
I consider that a separation between the existing SL model and the 
concept of employee participation in all its forms should be made. SLs arose as 
a way to boost employee ownership. They did not originate in the law but in 
reality: It was that first transport company that initiated the movement and then 
the law evolved to accommodate to that reality both in 1997 (first law) and in 2015 
(reform law). And the model is still in constant development as the legal 
materialization of employee participation. 
The model, however, is lacking. It is losing popularity despite its recent 
reform and some entrepreneurs still struggle with its rigidness. Therefore, 
growing companies appear to be growing out of it. 
 
Hypothesis number one was confirmed by the cohort analysis in the 
Basque Country. Five-year-old companies have displayed faster growth rates 
during their first three years than their conventional counterparts. This analysis 
also showed what I later confirmed with the case studies and the information from 
the Ikei reports: The SL model as it is currently formulated hinders growth and 
companies have to grow out of it if they seek to increase their size at a certain 
rate. I can take the idea further and conclude that employee participation is an 
efficient tool to boost growth, despite the way it is currently implemented in Spain. 
 
Hypothesis #1: “Despite their waning popularity, SLs are an effective tool that 
boost growth” 
 
Hypothesis #2: “Companies of certain size categories profit better from the SL 
model as a catalyst for their growth; for instance, micro and small businesses 
might use the model up until they grow into the medium bracket, which would 




This hypothesis was partially refuted as it was larger SLs that were able to 
generate the most employment in the DCM analysis, while micro-SLs were the 
most affected. This was true both in Spain and the Basque Country. Moreover, 
when compared with their conventional counterparts, employment generation in 
larger-than-micro companies was not clearly higher in SLs or in conventional 
companies. Thus, while it seems clear that micro-SLs struggled the most, it 
remains to be seen whether larger SLs were profiting better from the SL model 
because of employee participation or simply because, as larger companies, they 
were more resilient. 
 
While it is true that the Basque Country is economically more developed 
than the rest of Spain, due to how its economy is configured, it was especially 
affected by the 2008 financial crisis and, therefore, it is difficult to assess whether 
Basque companies, including Basque SLs, were better prepared. 
In the years I can compare employment generation for Basque and 
Spanish SLs, it is not clear that one group of companies outperformed the other. 
Basque SLs seem to have lost the most employment (in relative terms) during 
the crisis years, but they have generated more employment (in relative terms) in 
2017-2018, although the role of the 2016 tax reform in the Basque Country is not 
clear, as it was previously stated. 
Another point worth mentioning is that the average size of Basque SLs has 
been higher over the last decade than that of Spanish SLs, and this difference is 
not present between Spanish and Basque conventional companies, thus 
suggesting that the reason behind it is not the higher overall economic 
development in the Basque Country but the SL legal framework itself. 
This hypothesis could have been fully confirmed if the Basque and 
Spanish economies had had a more similar composition and if the Basque 
economy had not been particularly affected by the crisis. A possible interpretation 
is that if the Basque Country had not been more prepared and had not exercised 
Hypothesis #3: “The Basque Country is better prepared and thus SLs fare better 
than in the rest of the country.” 
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its tax autonomy correctly, then the impact would have been greater during the 
crisis years. 
 
2 Growth Factors in this Analysis 
 
After analyzing the data within the growth factors framework summarized 
in Fadahunsi (2012), I found it to be most appropriate for case studies rather than 
for the aggregate data analyses I carried out. 
In terms of firm factors, ownership form was a constant variable in the 
aggregate datasets for the DCM analysis. All other firm factors such as sector, 
company age, company size and location (rural/urban) were different, and their 
interplay could have unpredictable results. In the cohort analysis, age was also 
fixed, and I found that in combination with the SL ownership form, younger firms 
tend to grow faster than older conventional firms. 
Within entrepreneur factors, the one that stood out the most was 
motivation to grow. While a deeper study would be ideal, I noticed that among 
the case studies, the company that grew the most was the one that prioritized 
growth over their ownership form. Further studies should be carried out to find 
out whether existing and former SLs have growth as one of their objectives. 
Strategy factors are extremely company-specific, as each business has 
their own way of entering a market and succeeding in it. In my overall analysis, 
however, I noticed that even though the Basque Country is a highly international 
economy and internationalization plays an important role in growth, this was 
partially neutralized by how the crisis particularly affected the Basque economy. 
In terms of financial resources, the capitalization of unemployment benefits 
helped set up some of the companies in the case studies, but it did not seem to 
have made a difference in terms of growth. And while some of the case studies 
had lower indebtedness ratios than the sector average (Komunikazio Biziagoa, 
Hirunox and Izar), others did not and relied on external funding (Gran Sol and 
Kimu Bat, the latter perhaps due to its focus on innovation). Moreover, none of 
these companies showed significant signs of growth despite their access to 
capital through employee participation. 
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Regarding external factors, their importance became visible not only with 
the impact of the 2008 financial crisis but also with the separate tax regulations 
in both jurisdictions: In 2017-2018 employment was generated among Basque 
SLs while Spanish SLs displayed negative numbers, and 2016 is when the 
average size of Basque SLs stops dropping and starts growing. Moreover, in the 
cohort analysis I classified Basque cohorts according to their relation with the 
financial crisis and found that, in combination with the ownership structure, 
Basque SLs outperformed conventional companies in terms of growth except 
when companies were registered prior to, and therefore unaware of, the imminent 
crisis, thus questioning the ability of SLs to quickly adapt on the one hand, while 
also suggesting that the issue could be that conventional companies had a 
survival problem during the same period. 
 
3 Policy Recommendations 
 
I have identified two main issues regarding the existing SL model: one 
pertaining to implementation, which hinders the creation of new SLs; and another 
pertaining to the design of the model itself, which is both making growth more 
difficult while also obscuring the information on those companies that grow after 
disqualification. 
First, the SL model appears to have implementation issues in the sense 
that the public needs to learn more about its existence and how it works in order 
for potential entrepreneurs to be able to consider it and profit from it. While the 
2015 reform helped increase the number of qualifiable companies (i.e., 
companies that met the requirements regardless of whether they applied to 
become SLs or not), the actual number of new SLs did not; this remains true both 
for Spain in general and the Basque Country in particular. As explained in Bel 
Durán & Lejarriaga Pérez de las Vacas (2018), this points at two main causes: 
the lack of communication, due to which entrepreneurs are not aware that they 
can apply to become SLs; and the lack of incentives to make the concept 
attractive, such as the modest tax benefits to which SLs are entitled. To these, I 
add a combination of the two: the lack of knowledge on those incentives once the 
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SL is in operation. To solve these problems, a joint effort from all government 
levels should be carried out to promote SLs and employee participation in all its 
forms so that the “need for a change in mentality” mentioned in the IKEI reports 
loses importance. 
Second, existing companies seem to still have issues with the restrictions 
to hire employees even after the 2015 reform, and this is made evident by how 
the only case study that displayed significant growth disqualified in the process. 
In order to fix this issue, I suggest that instead of lowering the requirements 
further, a deeper redesign of the model be carried out. I believe that a progressive 
model would be a better fit than a binary “qualified/non-qualified” scheme. 
Instead, companies could be rated according to a set of parameters and then 
sorted into different categories within a hierarchy, each with a different set of 
benefits (e.g. more tax incentives for companies with a higher employee 
participation score and lower non-owner workers, as their access to external 
capital is more limited). This classification should be carried out automatically for 
all existing firms using current databases rather than companies having to 
actively seek it through extra bureaucratic processes. In this sense, participatory 
companies would gain more visibility as they would fall within a category within 
this progressive classification system, rather than their current status where no 
information is systematically gathered about them as they are in the same class 
as all other conventional firms. 
 
4 Data Collection Recommendations 
 
The data collection difficulties encountered during this investigation gave 
rise to the following recommendations on how data could be collected to better 
assess the SL model. In this sense, the different statistical services providers at 
the various government levels could strive to unify data classification criteria to 
ensure it can be compared. Unification criteria should be met regarding: 
• Collection date: By using unified data collection dates, one can ensure 
that the resulting data from different administrative levels is 
comparable, minimizing possible biases. Currently, some data is 
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gathered at the end of the fiscal year, while other is gathered at the 
beginning. 
• Size classification: Currently, some statistical services use different 
size brackets to classify their data, and some of their statistical 
products do not offer the option to break data down into size brackets. 
• Sector classification: There are currently several statistical products 
(especially within the Basque Country) with different classification 
systems to divide data into sectors, thus rendering the comparison 
across statistical products impossible. Moreover, some datasets show 
incomplete information for certain sectors. 
Besides database unification criteria, there is the issue of tracking 
disqualified SLs and participatory companies. Since the concept of participatory 
company was introduced, those firms have been considered conventional 
companies within the existing databases, as there is no system in place to identify 
them. The same happens with former SLs, regardless of whether they are still 
fostering employee ownership to a certain degree or not. This needs to change 
so that these firms can be analyzed separately, perhaps using the progressive 
classification model suggested above, or some additional labeling within the 
current framework. 
 
5 Potential Transference into Argentina 
 
Argentina also has set up an unemployment benefits system for registered 
workers terminated without a cause. Benefits are paid monthly between 6 to 18 
months depending on the age and the number of months the applicant worked in 
the past three years. Using this as a foundation, a similar system as the one in 
Spain could be put in place so that applicants can opt to receive the benefits as 
a lump sum for its investment. 
While the Bauen Hotel case mentioned in section I.4.3 is a notorious 
example of how workers are willing to take on the management of a failing 
business, it is not the only case in Argentina where employee ownership could 
have been a solution. Among other cases, I can mention the following: 
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Sancor: founded in 1938 by 16 cooperatives in the dairy sector, it grew to 
be one of the major milk producers in Argentina. Created as a cooperative, it built 
an important international presence by exporting to 30 countries around the 
world. Sancor encountered severe financial problems in 2006 and 2017 which 
required external funding to avoid bankruptcy. 
Vicentín SAIC: founded in 1929 as a sociedad anónima (joint-stock 
company), the family-owned company became a major agricultural group and the 
top soymeal exporter in Argentina. The company faced insolvency by the end of 
2019 after a credit-fueled expansion, which led the federal government to issue 
a decree in early 2020 to take over the company and rescue it. The plan was 
faced with backlash from industry leaders and the general public and the decree 
was finally repealed. 
While these two cases are the most notorious in the country due to their 
massive size, there are also plenty of smaller companies who could benefit from 
employee participation as a way to ensure continuity and facilitate growth. Among 
these are family businesses, which play a major role in the Argentine economy 
and struggle to ensure continuity from one generation to the following. These 
companies could profit from an employee-participation legal framework similar to 
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